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I. INTRODUCTION
We find the respondent’s testimony and the documentary evi-
dence of widespread violence directed against bisexual and ho-
mosexual individuals living in Jamaica troubling.  Based upon
the evidence before us, were the respondent eligible for asylum,
we might well be inclined to find that the burden of proof for
that form of relief had been met.  However, a higher standard of
proof is imposed for withholding and deferral of removal, and
we must agree that the respondent has failed to establish a clear
probability of persecution or torture upon his return to
Jamaica.1
When the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) wrote these
words, it was pointing out the harsh human reality of changes
made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA), a 1996 Congressional law which substantially
altered the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  One of the
provisions of IIRIRA changed the INA by requiring asylum seekers
to file their applications within one year of their last entry into the
United States unless they could prove that their case fell within
certain narrow exceptions to the rule.  While a primary rationale
behind the change in the law was to reduce the number of fraudu-
* Victoria Neilson is the Legal Director of Immigration Equality, formerly the Les-
bian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force.  Immigration Equality advocates for
equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and HIV-positive individuals
under U.S. immigration law.  Aaron Morris is a 2005 graduate of American University
Washington College of Law and a former legal intern with Immigration Equality.
Throughout this Article, the term “the Author” refers to Victoria Neilson, and the
term “the Authors” refers to both Victoria Neilson and Aaron Morris.
1 Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. 2003) (unpublished decision, on file with Immigration
Equality).  As the quotation suggests, if an applicant misses the one-year filing dead-
line he may still be able to qualify for “withholding of removal.”  However, the stan-
dard of proof for this form of relief is much higher than for asylum, and the benefits
of the status are much fewer. See infra Part II.D. for an in-depth discussion of with-
holding of removal.  Note that the term “withholding” is used throughout to refer to
“withholding of removal” or “withholding of deportation.”
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lent asylum applications,2 a major consequence of the change has
been to foreclose relief for untold numbers of otherwise eligible
and deserving asylum seekers.
This Article explores the detrimental effect of the arbitrary
and unjust one-year rule, namely, the deportation3 of many vulner-
able foreign nationals4 to the very countries from which they fled
due to a justifiable fear of persecution.  Part II explains the basics
of asylum and withholding and discusses the elevated standard of
proof required to win withholding.  Part III discusses the changes
in the law enacted by IIRIRA, specifically focusing on the imple-
mentation of the one-year filing deadline as well as the provisions
which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review one year is-
sues.  Part III also explains the severe limitations of the rights
granted to winners of withholding status, as opposed to asylum sta-
tus, in order to understand the human impact of the changes in
the law.  Part IV argues that the changes in the law have had partic-
ularly harsh consequences for individuals seeking asylum based on
their sexual orientation, transgender identity, or HIV-positive sta-
tus.  It also describes particular examples of exceptions to the law
which are likely to apply to these groups.  The Article concludes
with an appeal for the elimination of the one-year filing deadline,
or, short of that, for a liberal application of the exceptions to en-
sure that deserving applicants are not removed to countries from
which they are legitimately seeking protection.
II. IMMIGRATION LAW BASICS
A. The Basics of Asylum Eligibility
Asylum is a discretionary form of relief granted by the U.S.
government to foreign nationals who fit within the definition of a
refugee.5  The adjudication of asylum claims falls within the juris-
2 See infra Part III.A. for a fuller discussion of the background to the 1996 changes
in the law.
3 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).  The 1996 changes to the INA replaced the term “deporta-
tion” with “removal.”  INA § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2004).  Since older cases and arti-
cles use the term “deportation,” this Article will use the two terms interchangeably.
4 While the Immigration and Nationality Act uses the term “alien” to describe
individuals who are not U.S. citizens, this Article uses the term “foreign national”
unless it is quoting directly from another source.  Many commentators, including the
Authors, find the term “alien” offensive. See also Michele R. Pistone & Philip G.
Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 12 n.64
(2001) [hereinafter Improved but Still Unfair] (discussing the choice to use the term
“alien” in their article).
5 A person is granted “refugee” status if she makes her application and is granted
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diction of asylum officers who function within the Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS) branch of the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS)6 and the immigration courts of the Depart-
ment of Justice.7  Applicants may initially file for relief with CIS
which has independent authority to grant asylum.8  If a CIS asylum
officer denies the application and the foreign national does not
have legal status at the time of the asylum officer’s decision,9 she
will be immediately placed in removal proceedings.10  At that time,
she may renew the application before an immigration judge.11  Asy-
lum applications can also be filed defensively when a foreign na-
tional is placed in removal proceedings for an unrelated reason.12
Defensive asylum applications are adjudicated by the immigration
protection while still outside the United States.  Although the legal grounds for apply-
ing are the same, if the application is made from inside the United States, it is called
an “asylum” application. See infra text accompanying note 14 for the definition of a
“refugee.”
6 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Program Overview, avail-
able at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/overview.htm (last visited Aug. 31,
2005). See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.2 (2004).  In 2004, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) was created and the functions of the former agency, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), were divided among agencies within DHS.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the enforcement branch of DHS and
oversees the trial attorneys in removal proceedings.  The U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services (CIS) is the service branch of DHS which oversees the asylum offices.
See Immigration Law Review, The INS No Longer: Immigration and Asylum under the De-
partment of Homeland Security, THE LESBIAN AND GAY IMMIGRATION RIGHTS TASK FORCE
STATUS REPORT 1, 4 (2003), available at http://www.immigrationequality.org/
uploadedfiles/1newsletter2003.pdf.
7 See U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Organ-
ization and Information Breakdown, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.
htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1 and 208.2 (2004).
8 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b) (2004).
9 If an applicant has lawful status at the time that the application is denied, she
will be issued a Notice of Intent to Deny by the asylum office.  The applicant then has
16 days to present rebuttal evidence before the asylum office will make a final deci-
sion on the application.  If the applicant is still unsuccessful, the asylum application
will be denied and the applicant will be able to continue to remain in the United
States for the duration of her lawful status.  There is no appeal at this point, although
the applicant may again apply for asylum after falling out of status, at which point if
she is again unsuccessful at the asylum office, she will be placed in removal proceed-
ings.  8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c). See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Types
of Asylum Decisions, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/types.htm#notice
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
10 Id.
11 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3)(i) (2004).
12 Examples of ways in which foreign nationals may also be placed in removal pro-
ceedings include (1) arriving in the United States without a proper visa, (2) being
discovered working illegally in an ICE raid, (3) being unable to produce proper docu-
mentation of legal status if stopped by an immigration official near the border or at
an airport, or (4) after coming into contact with local police by committing a crime or
driving infraction.
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judge in the same way as affirmative applications.  In deciding
whether to grant asylum, these officers and judges must first deter-
mine whether an applicant meets the definition of a refugee,13
which was adopted into U.S. law pursuant to international obliga-
tions under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 1967.14
To satisfy the definition of refugee, an individual must prove
that she has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of her race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.15
While the INA does not define “persecution,” courts have recog-
nized its presence in cases where the applicant has suffered physi-
cal harm, such as repeated physical assaults,16 female genital
mutilation17 or confinement and torture.18  Additionally, courts
have found the existence of persecution in cases where the appli-
cant was subjected to a severe non-physical injury, such as intense
discrimination or severe economic deprivation.19
When an applicant can demonstrate that past mistreatment on
account of one of the five protected grounds rises to the level of
persecution, he meets the definition of refugee.20  Moreover, once
an applicant has established that past persecution has occurred, he
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.21  If
no past persecution has occurred, or past mistreatment is not se-
13 INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2000).
14 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (discussing the defini-
tion of a refugee found in the Refugee Act of 1980 and holding that “[i]f one thing is
clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee’ . . . it is that one of
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968.”). For an excel-
lent discussion of the statutory history and development of asylum law, see Elwin Grif-
fith, Problems of Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Proceedings Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 255 (1996).
15 INA § 208(b) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2000); INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
16 See In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding that a Moroccan
woman suffered persecution because her father found her to be too liberal and often
beat and isolated her).
17 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that a 19-year-
old woman’s fear of ritual female genital mutilation in Togo constituted persecution).
18 Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a man’s fear of
facing prosecution, detention, and economic problems in China constituted
persecution).
19 Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re Kasinga: The Decision’s Legacy, 7 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 357, 362-63 (1998).
20 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2004).
21 8 C.F.R. § 209.13(b)(1) (2004).
2005] THE GAY BAR 237
vere enough to constitute persecution, an applicant must affirma-
tively prove that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution in
order to qualify for asylum.22
Initially, some circuits interpreted the statute to require that
persecution be more likely than not in order for an applicant to be
eligible for asylum.23  Over time, however, the standard has eased.
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,24 a Nicaraguan woman sought to prove a
well-founded fear of persecution based on the imprisonment and
torture of her brother as a result of his anti-governmental political
actions.  The woman argued that although she had not personally
participated in any of the political activities, her relationship to and
association with her brother put her at risk of persecution in the
form of interrogation and torture.25  After applying withholding of
removal’s “clear probability of persecution” standard to her asylum
claim, the immigration judge hearing the case found that the wo-
man had failed to prove that she was eligible for discretionary re-
lief.26  On appeal, the BIA27 affirmed the immigration judge’s
opinion, acquiescing to the use of the clear probability standard.28
However, the Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA decision, specifi-
cally rejecting “clear probability” in favor of a more generous stan-
dard.29  The case was granted certiorari to resolve what had
become a circuit conflict.30  Instead of requiring that persecution
be more likely than not, the Supreme Court relied on authority
stating that even a one in ten chance (and possibly less) of facing
future persecution should be sufficient to warrant a well-founded
22 8 C.F.R. § 209.13(b)(2) (2004).
23 See, e.g., Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that the govern-
ment’s application of a clear probability standard had generally been accepted for
relief against deportation before the Refugee Act of 1980, and that the standard still
applied in asylum cases subsequent to the Act); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th
Cir. 1977) (converging the clear probability standard and the well-founded fear stan-
dard); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967) (limiting the attorney
general’s discretionary suspension of deportation to cases where there was a clear
probability of persecution).
24 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
25 Id. at 424-25.
26 Id. at 425.
27 In immigration cases, foreign nationals appeal from decisions by immigration
judges to an administrative appellate body, the BIA.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2004).  Ap-
peals from the BIA are taken directly to the federal court of appeals.  INA
§ 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2004).
28 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425.
29 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1985).
30 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 426. See, e.g., Rejaie, 691 F. 2d at 146; Kashani, 547
F.2d at 379; Cheng Kai Fu, 386 F.2d at 753.
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fear.31  This change in the standard of proof dramatically increased
the ability of applicants to succeed with their claims for asylum in
the United States.32
B. The Particular Social Group Ground for Asylum Eligibility
In addition to liberalizing the persecution standard, over the
last twenty years, the U.S. government has also expanded the basis
through which applicants can qualify for asylum under the “partic-
ular social group” category.  As described in the previous Part, to
qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that the persecu-
tion she experienced was on account of one of five protected
grounds.33  Of the five grounds, the particular social group cate-
gory has been described as the “most elastic and nebulous”34 as it
encompasses “persons of similar background, habits or social sta-
tus.”35  The BIA defines particular social groups to include persons
who “share a common, immutable characteristic . . . [which] must
be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences.”36  Over time, this
ground for relief has expanded to include groups based on gen-
der, including women who have been subjected to female genital
mutilation and domestic violence,37 groups based on sexual orien-
tation,38 and even some groups based on transgender and HIV
status.39
31 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
32 In 1987, the year in which the Supreme Court distinguished “clear probability”
from “well-founded fear,” the approval rate for asylum applications rose to 54% from
30% the previous year. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA-
TION STATISTICS 56 (Sept. 2004), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
aboutus/statistics/2003Yearbook.pdf.
33 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2004).
34 Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender
Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 282 (2002).
35 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (establishing the
nature of the particular social group and quoting the UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REF-
UGEE STATUS, ¶¶ 77-78 (1979) U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng./Rev.1, available at www.
unhcr.org).
36 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N.  Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (rejecting the claim that
taxi cab drivers from El Salvador constituted a particular social group because they
could have changed jobs without interfering with their fundamental identity).
37 See generally Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum
Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777 (2003).
38 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
39 See infra Part II.C.
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C. Sexual Orientation, Transgender Identity, and HIV Status as
Particular Social Groups
In 1990, the same year that the ban on homosexual immigra-
tion was lifted,40 the BIA upheld a grant of withholding of deporta-
tion to a gay man from Cuba in a then unpublished decision
entitled Matter of Toboso-Alfonso.41  Although Toboso-Alfonso was
denied asylum by the immigration judge because of certain crimi-
nal convictions, he was granted withholding of deportation.  The
immigration judge found that his forced registration with the gov-
ernment, frequent police detention, and sentencing to hard labor,
constituted persecution on account of his membership in a particu-
lar social group, namely homosexual men.42
The case was designated as precedent by Attorney General Ja-
net Reno in 1994, thereby requiring asylum officers, immigration
courts, and the BIA to follow the holding in all similar cases.43  Al-
though it is impossible to know the exact number of asylum appli-
cants who have filed claims based on sexual orientation,
transgender identity, or HIV status,44 it is probable that thousands
of foreign nationals have been granted asylum in the United States
on these grounds since 1994.45
In addition to the grants of asylum based on sexual orienta-
tion, some cases by transgender individuals have been successful.
For example, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum and withholding to
a Mexican transgender individual who had been raped by local po-
lice and stabbed with a knife by an angry mob in Hernandez-Montiel
v. INS.46  Although the court did not address whether transgender
identity constituted a particular social group, or decide whether
Hernandez-Montiel was in fact transsexual, it did find that he quali-
fied for asylum on account of his membership in the particular
40 Robert C. Leitner, Note, A Flawed System Exposed:  The Immigration Adjudicatory
System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 686 (2004).
41 See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819.
42 Id. at 819-21.
43 Reno Designates Gay Case as Precedent, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 859 (1994) (dis-
cussing Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994)).
44 CIS does not keep statistics which break down asylum claims by the ground
under which the applicant has applied.  See Victoria Neilson, Homosexual or Female:
Applying Gender-Based Asylum Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 417, 418 (2005).
45 Lavi Soloway, one of the founders of Immigration Equality, estimated that ap-
proximately 2000 asylum applications had been filed based on sexual orientation.
Symposium, Recent Developments in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
169, 187-88 (2000-2001).
46 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2000).
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social group of gay men with female sexual identities.47
Four years later, in Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft,48  the Ninth Circuit
granted a petition for review and remanded a transgender appli-
cant’s claims for relief under the Convention against Torture49 and
for withholding of removal.50  The case involved a male to female
transgender person from El Salvador who had been kidnapped,
raped, and beaten by a group of men who threatened him51 with
future assaults.52  The court held that Reyes belonged to the same
particular social group as Hernandez-Montiel and characterized
him as a gay man with “deep female identity.”53  Thus, while there
have been successful asylum cases by transgender individuals, there
are currently no precedential decisions which have established
transgender identity as a recognized particular social group.54
Similarly, although there has not been a precedential decision
finding that HIV-positive status constitutes membership in a partic-
ular social group, there have been a few asylum grants based on
HIV status.55  In one such non-precedential case, a woman from
47 Id. at 1087.  This Article uses the male pronoun to describe Hernandez-Montiel
because that is the pronoun used by the court in its decision.
48 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
49 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment of Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
50 The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Reyes’s claim for asylum be-
cause he filed well beyond the one-year filing deadline.  384 F.3d  at 786-787.
51 This Article uses the male pronoun to describe Reyes because that is the pro-
noun used by the court in its decision.
52 384 F.3d  at 785.
53 Id. at 785, n.1 (commenting that Reyes’s sexual orientation, for which he was
targeted, and his “transsexual behavior, are intimately connected”).
54 For one example of a successful claim by a transgender woman from Argentina,
see Melissa Castillo-Garsow, An Odyssey to Asylum, GAY CITY NEWS,  Dec. 30, 2004–Jan.
5, 2005, available at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_353/anodysseytoasylum.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2005).  Additionally, the Author is personally aware of other cases
based on transgender identity which have been granted both by asylum officers and
immigration judges, but none of these cases have precedential value.
55 See generally Victoria Neilson, On the Positive Side: Using a Foreign National’s HIV-
Positive Status in Support of an Application to Remain in the United States, 19 AIDS & PUB.
POL’Y J. 45, 48 (2004) [hereinafter On the Positive Side]. See also Victoria Neilson, HIV-
Based Persecution in Asylum and Immigration Decisions, 31 HUM. RTS. 8 (2004) (a con-
densed version of On the Positive Side: Using a Foreign National’s HIV-Positive Status in
Support of an Application to Remain in the United States, 19 AIDS & PUB. POL’Y J. 1 (2004)).
In a recent case, Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the BIA’s decision that a gay, HIV-positive man from Leba-
non did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he had to return to his country.
While the Court did not explicitly hold that Karouni’s HIV-positive status made him a
member of a particular social group, the Court did note that the INS had adopted a
position “‘that homosexuals do constitute a particular social group.’” Id. at 1171.
Even more recently, in Boer-Sedano v. Gonzalez, 418 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005), the
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India won a grant of asylum from an immigration judge in 2000.
The judge found that “married women in India who have con-
tracted HIV, who fear that their families will disown them or force
them to get a divorce, and who wish to or need to be employed”
constitute a particular social group.56  It should be noted that this
case was unusual because the Indian Supreme Court had recently
ruled that HIV-positive individuals could not marry in India.  As a
result, since she was married, the applicant could have faced crimi-
nal prosecution because of her HIV-positive status.57  In many HIV-
based claims, it is difficult to show this level of governmental ani-
mus.  Although many HIV-positive individuals fear returning to
their countries because there is little or no advanced HIV treat-
ment available, in general, the United States does not recognize
that such hardship-based claims amount to government sponsored
or sanctioned persecution.58
Despite these significant advances in protecting the rights of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) and HIV-positive peo-
ple, innumerable deserving claimants have undoubtedly been de-
nied asylum in the United States because of an unjust and
unnecessary time limitation imposed by the INA.59  Although appli-
cants may fit the definition of refugee and may be at great danger
of persecution or even death if returned to their countries of ori-
gin, once they miss the one-year filing requirement they are statu-
torily ineligible for asylum with few exceptions.
D. The Basics of Withholding Eligibility
When asylum seekers miss the one-year filing deadline their
primary hope of remaining in the United States is through a grant
of withholding of removal.60  Withholding is a form of relief that is
related to asylum, but which carries a higher standard of proof and
offers greatly reduced rights and privileges.  Like asylum, it is a do-
Court analyzed the applicant’s HIV-positive status and determined that based on his
health it would be unreasonable to require him to relocate within Mexico.
56 Ostracism, Lack of Medical Care Support HIV-Positive Alien’s Asylum Quest, IJ Rules, 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 233 (2001).
57 Id. at 234.
58 See On the Positive Side, supra note 55, at 47-48.
59 See infra Part IV for a complete discussion of the impact of the one-year filing
deadline on LGBT and HIV-positive individuals fleeing persecution.
60 There are several other humanitarian forms of relief for which an applicant who
is denied asylum may be eligible, including relief under the Convention against Tor-
ture, deferred action, and private bills. See Convention against Torture supra note 49.
These forms of relief are generally more difficult to obtain than withholding of re-
moval, and are beyond the scope of this Article.
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mestic remedy derived from the United States’ international obli-
gations pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which contains
a non-refoulement provision.61  Although the same application
form is used for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention against Torture,62 withholding cannot be granted
by an officer of CIS; it can only be granted by an immigration
judge.63  Another feature distinguishing withholding from asylum
is that withholding is mandatory if an applicant proves eligibility,
whereas asylum is a discretionary grant of relief.64  Even if an appli-
cant wins withholding, the limited rights which attach to the status
make it nearly impossible for an individual who wins withholding
to ever lead a normal, fully integrated life in the United States.
As with asylum, a withholding applicant who can demonstrate
past persecution on account of one of the five protected character-
istics65 is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she will suffer
future persecution.66  However, if a withholding applicant is unable
to demonstrate past persecution, she must meet a much higher le-
gal standard regarding the likelihood of future persecution: she
must prove that it is “more likely than not” that she would be perse-
cuted in the future.67
The Supreme Court set forth the standard for withholding in
INS v. Stevic.68  In Stevic, a Yugoslavian man applied for withholding
of deportation following his involvement in an anti-Communist or-
ganization.69  Initially, the Second Circuit remanded the case for
61 “Non-refoulement” is a prohibition on the expulsion or return of a refugee to
the place where her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984) (holding that the 1967 Refugee Protocol, to
which the United States was a signatory, bound the U.S. to Articles 2-34 of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2001).
62 See U.S. CIS, I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, availa-
ble at  http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/i-589.pdf (last visited Sept. 1,
2005).
63 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (2004).
64 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(1) (2004).  For a discussion of discretionary factors which
are relevant to granting asylum as opposed to withholding, see Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2004).
65 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
66 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i) (2004).  Although the regulations contain a pre-
sumption of future persecution for withholding applicants just as they do for asylum
applicants, in practice the Author has found that judges tend to invoke a higher stan-
dard for finding past persecution in withholding cases.
67 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2004).
68 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
69 Id. at 410.
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reconsideration after finding that the reasonable fear of persecu-
tion standard70 employed in asylum cases was also appropriate for
withholding cases.71  The Supreme Court overturned the ruling,
explaining that “the ‘clear probability of persecution’ standard re-
main[ed] applicable to . . . withholding of deportation claims.”72
The Court further held that an application for withholding may
only be successful if it is “supported by evidence establishing that it
is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion . . . .”73
In 1997, the BIA offered some clarification on the type of evi-
dence required to establish a claim based on persecution.  In In re
S-M-J-, the BIA held that although an applicant’s credible testimony
could suffice to prove an asylum or withholding claim, an applicant
should nevertheless “provide supporting evidence, both of general
country conditions and of the specific facts sought to be relied on
by the applicant, where such evidence is available,” and where
“such evidence is unavailable, the applicant must explain its un-
availability . . . .”74
Given the higher standard of proof for withholding, it is often
impossible for a withholding applicant to document her claim ade-
quately.75  Since the same evidence is used in both an applicant’s
70 See supra Part II.A.
71 Id. at 412 (The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that,
in the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress had abandoned the “clear probability of perse-
cution” standard and substituted the “well-founded fear of persecution” language in
order to comply with the definition of a refugee posited United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.). See also supra note 14.  The Court held instead
that “to the extent such a standard can be inferred from the bare language [of the
provision], it appears that a likelihood of persecution is required.” Stevic, 467 U.S.  at
408.
72 Id. at 430.
73 Id.
74 In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997). See also Brian P. Downey &
Angelo A. Stio III, “Of Course We Believe You, But . . .”  The Third Circuit’s Position on
Corroboration of Credible Testimony, 48 VIL. L. REV. 1281, 1293-00 (2003) (discussing the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ disagreement with the evidentiary requirements of
Matter of S-M-J-).  The recently enacted REAL ID Act has codified this requirement for
collaboration or detailed explanation as to its unavailability.  REAL ID Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
75 See Virgil Wiebe, et al., Asking for a Note From Your Torturer: Corroboration and Au-
thentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture Convention Claims, 1 IMMIGR.
& NAT’LITY L. HANDBOOK 414 (Randy P. Auerbach ed., 2001-02) (commenting that
evidence of arrests, detention, identity, nationality, presence in a refugee camp, place
of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, publicly held office, and medical
treatment, all of which have been suggested as necessary corroborating evidence by
the BIA, may be extremely difficult for an applicant to find while they are outside of
their home country, and may be dangerous for the applicant’s family to obtain within
the home country).
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claims for asylum and for withholding, when an immigration judge
finds that an applicant has not met the standard of proof for asy-
lum, the withholding claim must also necessarily fail.  That is, be-
cause the standard for withholding is higher than that for asylum,
if an applicant fails to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, she also fails to prove that it is more likely than not that she
will be persecuted if she is returned to her country of origin.  How-
ever, even when withholding is granted, recipients face great obsta-
cles to life in the United States because the opportunities provided
by the relief are substantially fewer than those provided to asylees.
E. The Effects of Winning Asylum Versus Withholding of Removal
Asylum is a very good status to hold under U.S. immigration
law.  As an asylee, a foreign national is entitled to work in the
United States without having to file for an employment authoriza-
tion document.76  An individual with asylum status can also obtain
an unrestricted social security card.77  Additionally, an asylee can
apply for derivative asylum status78 for her immediate relatives, in-
cluding her opposite sex spouse or minor children, and may apply
for a refugee travel document which will allow for travel abroad.79
76 INS Memorandum from William Yates, Acting Associate Director, Operations,
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, to Regional Directors, The Meaning
of 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(a) as it Relates to Refugee and Asylee Authorization for Employment,
HQADJ 70/21.1.13 (on file with Immigration Equality), available at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/lawsregs/handbook/Asylees031003.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
77 Most foreign nationals who have employment authorization in the United States
are issued “restricted” social security cards which contain the notation “valid only with
INS employment authorization.” See SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, DOCUMENTS YOU NEED
TO WORK IN THE U.S., available at http://www.ssa.gov/immigration/documents.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
78 8 C.F.R. § 208.21 (2004).  Derivative asylum status allows an asylee’s relatives to
come to the United States as asylees.
79 8 C.F.R. § 223.2 (2004).  A refugee travel document functions and looks like a
passport.  An asylee may not travel to the country from which she claimed persecution
or her asylee status may be revoked.  Additionally, there are potential risks for asylees
traveling abroad if they accrued more than six months of unlawful presence in the
United States before filing their applications for asylum.  The IIRIRA implemented a
three year/ten year bar under which foreign nationals who have accrued six months
or more of unlawful presence in the United States cannot return to the United States
for three years if they leave the country.  Foreign nationals who travel outside the
United States after accruing a year or more of unlawful presence cannot return for
ten years.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2000).  There is no provi-
sion in the INA exempting asylees from these bars.  Thus, there is a risk for asylees
who have accrued unlawful presence to travel internationally until they obtain legal
permanent residence.  In practice, it does not appear that the three year/ten year bar
is routinely enforced against asylees traveling with a refugee travel document, but
there is no official communication from CIS unequivocally permitting re-entry for
such individuals.
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Most importantly, an asylee can apply to adjust her status to that of
legal permanent resident one year after receiving asylum.80
The law allowing asylees to apply for legal permanent resi-
dence includes liberal waiver policies for violations of the immigra-
tion law.  Violations which would otherwise render an applicant
inadmissible, including entering without inspection, entering with
fraudulent documents, and suffering from health problems, in-
cluding HIV, may be waived on humanitarian grounds for
asylees.81  Finally, four years after gaining legal permanent resident
status, asylees, like other legal permanent residents, can apply to
naturalize as U.S. citizens.82  Under the INA, the difference in
rights given to asylees and those granted withholding are
profound.
One reason that withholding creates obstacles for foreign na-
tionals is that it is a less defined legal status than asylum.  The stan-
dard for withholding appears in the INA within the section entitled
“Detention and Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed.”83  Because
of this, many attorneys believe that when a foreign national is
granted withholding, a final order of removal is simultaneously en-
tered against her.84  In fact, neither the statute nor the regulations
explicitly state that an order of withholding must be accompanied
by a final order of removal.85  Still, it is the practice of some immi-
80 8 C.F.R. § 209.2 (2004).  Currently, there is a backlog of approximately twelve
years for asylees seeking to obtain legal permanent residence. See U.S. CIS, Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Adjustment of Status for Asylees, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
fieldoffices/nebraska/asyleeadj.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).  The recently enacted
REAL ID Act has removed the cap of 10,000 asylee adjustments per year.  REAL ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.  It remains to be seen whether CIS
assigns enough officers to these cases to significantly reduce the backlog.
81 INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2000).
82 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a) (2004).  Asylees who adjust status are considered legal per-
manent residents as of the date one year before their residence application was ap-
proved.  8 C.F.R. § 209.2(f).
83 INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000) (stating that “[n]otwithstanding
paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if
the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in
that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion”).
84 Information about the consequences of a withholding grant is so hard to come
by that every few weeks there are questions posted on the message boards of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) about what benefits, if any, attach
to a grant of withholding.  These message boards allow immigration practitioners to
pose vexing questions and obtain feedback from other practitioners.  AILA message
boards are available to AILA members at http://www.aila.org.
85 In a case decided shortly after the 1980 passage of the Refugee Act, the BIA
addressed the standard and consequences of asylum versus withholding.  The Immi-
gration Judge had entered an order of deportation and simultaneously ordered that
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gration judges to order removal simultaneously with a grant of
withholding, and for others to simply grant withholding without
entering a removal order.86  The Immigration Judge Benchbook is si-
lent on this issue, and only instructs judges that they “should note
that withholding of deportation confers no immigration benefit
other than a prohibition against deportation to a particular coun-
try[,]” and that “[t]his benefit may be withdrawn where conditions
change in the country from which the applicant fled.”87
Thus, unlike asylees who enjoy a statutory right to apply for
legal permanent residence after one year, individuals with with-
holding have no such right.88  The INA also contains no provision
allowing foreign nationals granted withholding to petition for de-
rivative status for family members.89  Moreover, unlike asylees, indi-
viduals granted withholding do not have the ability to apply for a
refugee travel document.90  The effect of this combined lack of
the applicant’s deportation to the People’s Republic of China be withheld.  The BIA
wrote, “A grant of section 243(h) [the former INA section governing withholding]
relief is merely a stay of deportation.  Should substantial changes occur in the country
from which such relief is granted, or if, for other reasons, the grant should need to be
reevaluated, the Service can move for reopening.” Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15,
16 n.2 (B.I.A. 1981).
86 Again, there does not appear to be any legal requirement for judges to enter a
removal order.  In general, when an immigration judge grants relief, she fills out a
pre-printed relief check-off form with different options.  Some judges simultaneously
check-off removal and withholding of removal, whereas others do not enter an order
of removal and merely enter the withholding grant.  It is unclear whether there is a
substantive reason for this difference or merely lack of guidance and consistency.
This anecdotal information comes from the Author’s conversations with other practi-
tioners and from immigration listserv discussions on the topic.
87  2 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BENCHBOOK 561-62 (4th ed. 2001) (reprinted by American Immigration Law Law-
yers Association).
88 See Anwen Hughes, Withholding of Removal, BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 2004, 139
PLI/NY 327, 332 (2004).  Another example of the confusion surrounding the mean-
ing of a grant of withholding status occurred in a recent Ninth Circuit decision con-
cerning a claim for Convention against Torture (CAT) relief.  In dicta distinguishing
CAT-based withholding from CAT-based deferral of removal, the Ninth Circuit mis-
takenly wrote: “[w]ithholding entitles the alien to remain indefinitely in the United
States and eventually to apply for permanent residence; deferral also prevents re-
moval, but confers no lawful or permanent status.”  Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118,
1121 (9th Cir. 2004).  In fact, as with INA § 241(b)(3) based withholding, there is no
provision for those granted CAT-based withholding to adjust status.
89 See Hughes, supra note 88, at 332. See also Lori Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gen-
der-based Violence Abroad:  United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 94, n.90 (2004) (summarizing argu-
ments that prohibitions against family unity are emerging as a potential breach of
international law).
90 There is no provision in the INA or regulations permitting individuals with with-
holding to apply for a refugee travel document, nor does the application form (form
I-131) indicate that it is intended for use by individuals with withholding status.  The
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rights is severe.  Since an individual granted withholding cannot
travel abroad or petition for family members to obtain status in the
United States they will often, as a practical matter, never see their
family members again.91
There is one provision in the regulations which is intended to
soften the harsh consequences of a withholding grant.  The regula-
tions allow an individual who was denied asylum, and who is
thereby precluded from petitioning for her spouse or minor chil-
dren to join her in the United States to ask the judge to reconsider
the denial of the asylum application “solely in the exercise of dis-
cretion.”92  Since asylum applications denied for missing the one-
year deadline are denied on a statutory ground rather than as a
matter of discretion, the provision does not appear to be available
to those who are granted withholding because of the one-year bar
on asylum.93  This leads to the anomalous result that individuals
who have been denied asylum on discretionary grounds that do
not rise to the level of a statutory bar, such as criminal activity,
forum shopping, or entering with fraudulent documents,94 are
treated better under the law than those who merely were unaware
of an artificial and recently enacted filing deadline.
Since an individual granted withholding does not have the
right to apply for adjustment of status to legal permanent resi-
dence, her status in the United States remains forever insecure.
This is particularly true because if the United States determines
Refugee Travel Document application form instructions state that “a refugee travel
document is issued to a person classified as a refugee or an asylee . . . .”  U.S. CIS,
Form I-131 Instructions, Application for Travel Document 2 (Rev. Apr. 16, 2004),
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/I-131.pdf (last visited
Sept. 1, 2005).  Although there does not appear to be any authority to issue a refugee
travel document to a person who has been granted withholding status, one practi-
tioner on an AILA message board (see supra note 84) reported having successfully
obtained a refugee travel document for a client with withholding status.  This exam-
ple highlights the fact that CIS employees are probably as confused about the benefits
that attach to withholding status as practitioners.
91 It should be noted that an individual who comes from a country where he fears
persecution, almost by definition, also comes from a country from which it is difficult
for its citizens to obtain visas to the United States.  All foreign nationals applying for
tourist visas to the United States must overcome a presumption that they intend to
remain in the United States permanently.  INA § 214 (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2004).
If the individual’s family member is unable to obtain a visa to the United States, the
individual who has been granted withholding cannot ever see the family member
again.  While asylees’ family members may face the same difficulties in obtaining visas
to the United States, it is at least possible for the asylee to travel to a neutral third
country to which it may be easier for his relatives to travel.
92 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e) (2004).
93 See Lam, 18 I. & N. at  18.
94 See Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (B.I.A. 1982).
248 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:233
that conditions in her home country have changed such that her
fear of persecution no longer exists, she can be removed to that
country.95  Likewise, if the United States can locate a safe third
country that is willing to accept the foreign national, she can be
removed to that country.96  Therefore an individual who has won
withholding may never feel fully secure that she can remain in the
United States permanently.
It is also unclear whether an individual with withholding status
has the ability to adjust that status to that of legal permanent resi-
dence should she secure another means of obtaining residence,
such as marrying a United States citizen, applying through the fam-
ily preference system, winning the diversity visa lottery, or finding
an employer sponsor.97  The answer to this question may depend
on whether the immigration judge issued a final order of removal
in the case.  In general, in order to be permitted to adjust status to
legal permanent residence from within the United States, a foreign
national must not be “inadmissible”98 and must have maintained
lawful status in the United States.99  Individuals who have been or-
dered removed from the United States are inadmissible for ten
years after their removal or departure.100  Asylum applicants who
are granted withholding for missing the one-year deadline have, by
95 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1)(b)(1) (2004); 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1)(f) (2004).
96 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f) (2004).  Theoretically, for example, this could mean that
any foreign national who is Jewish and wins withholding could be removed to Israel
because Israel will accept virtually any Jew who wishes to immigrate.  Philip G. Schrag
& Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of Fair Procedure, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 279 (1997) [hereinafter Not Yet a Model].
97 In Matter of K-, the BIA considered whether a conviction for an aggravated fel-
ony should constitute a statutory bar for grants of withholding, as it already did for
grants of asylum.  The applicant argued that such convictions should not constitute a
bar because, unlike asylum, grants of withholding do not lead to permanent resi-
dence.  The BIA wrote, “[w]e note the policy argument raised by the respondent that
it would not necessarily be inconsistent for Congress to make ‘danger to the commu-
nity’ a separate and distinct test in section 243(h)(2)(B), and thereby allow for the
possibility of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony to qualify for withholding of
deportation, even if asylum is categorically denied to aggravated felons, because a
grant of asylum contemplates the adjustment of the alien to lawful permanent resi-
dent status in this country and withholding only requires that the alien not be de-
ported to the country of persecution.”  Matter of K-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 418, 425 (B.I.A.
1991) (interim decision).  Here, while the BIA notes that individuals with withholding
are not statutorily entitled to adjust status, the BIA does not explicitly rule that they
are barred from adjusting status.
98 INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000); INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
99 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(6) (2004).
100 INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
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definition, failed to maintain lawful status in the United States.101
Therefore, it seems clear that for most paths to legal permanent
residence102 an individual who was granted withholding would be
unable to adjust status.103
What remains unclear is whether an individual who has been
granted withholding would be able to adjust if she married a U.S.
citizen or was sponsored for adjustment by an adult U.S. citizen son
or daughter.  In general, an adjustment applicant who is being
sponsored by a U.S. citizen immediate relative can proceed with
her application even if she has not maintained lawful status in the
United States, so long as she entered with inspection.104  Individu-
als who have been ordered removed from the United States are
inadmissible for ten years after their removal or departure.105
Thus, the ability of an individual who has been granted withhold-
ing to adjust status through an immediate relative would seem to
be dependent on whether the immigration judge entered an order
of removal against the individual with withholding,106 or on
whether the CIS officer adjudicating the adjustment application
believes that anyone who has been granted withholding has also
been ordered removed.107  If there is a removal order, or if the
local CIS office rejects the adjustment of status application, the in-
dividual who had been granted withholding would have to make a
motion to reopen the removal proceedings, have the removal or-
der and withholding grant vacated, and ask the judge to adjudicate
the adjustment of status application.  Since there are strict time
limits on reopening removal proceedings, this procedure would
101 Since there is an exception to the one-year filing deadline for individuals who
maintain lawful status until a reasonable period of time prior to filing for asylum, any
applicant who is denied asylum based on the one-year deadline would have to have
been out of status for some period of time prior to filing her application for asylum
and withholding. See infra Part IV.B.3.
102 As discussed in the next paragraph, adjustment applications based on sponsor-
ship by an immediate relative who is a U.S. citizen are treated differently than other
categories of legal permanent resident applicants.
103 Some individuals win withholding rather than asylum because they have crimi-
nal convictions which result in the asylum application being denied.  Whether individ-
uals with withholding in that category who never accrued unlawful presence in the
United States would be eligible to adjust is beyond the scope of this Article.
104 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(6) (2004); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(3) (2004).
105 INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
106 See supra note 88.
107 See supra notes 85-87.  Again, on AILA message boards discussing the possibility
of adjustment for individuals with withholding status, some practitioners report hav-
ing legal permanent residence applications granted without any difficulties.  Others
have been told by district offices that only the immigration judge had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the adjustment application.
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probably only be possible if the attorney for Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE)108 agreed to file a joint motion asking the
court to reopen the proceedings.109  If the ICE attorney did not
agree to do so, the foreign national would have no way to adjust
status or to appeal the ICE attorney’s decision not to join the
motion.110
Since individuals with withholding cannot obtain legal perma-
nent residence, it goes without saying that they can never natural-
ize.  Thus they can never vote, serve on juries, or otherwise become
fully equal members of American society.  The limitations of with-
holding as a status force recipients of the relief into a never-ending
legal limbo.111
In stark contrast, in legal contexts other than immigration law,
individuals who have withholding status are often treated identi-
cally to those with asylum status.  For example, both asylees and
those with withholding status may be eligible to receive welfare,
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps for up
to seven years upon receiving their status.112  In fact, in this limited
area of federal financial assistance, and for certain housing subsi-
dies,113 foreign nationals who have been granted withholding have
108 See supra note 6 (discussing the various divisions within DHS that are responsible
for regulation and enforcing immigration laws).
109 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2004).  It is also possible for a court or the BIA to reopen a
decision sua sponte but this power is rarely exercised.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.
110 While much of the above discussion is irrelevant to lesbians and gay men who
cannot currently enter into relationships which are recognized by the U.S. federal
government, the consequences of marriage to a U.S. citizen may be relevant to bisex-
ual, transgender, and HIV-positive foreign nationals.
111 Jaya Ramji contends that this limbo status “is arguably contrary to the spirit of
the non-refoulement principle and violative of other articles of the Refugee Conven-
tion” because the Refugee Convention states that “the Contracting State shall as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”  Jaya Ramji, Legislat-
ing Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 123-24 n.36 (2001).
112 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, revoked the eligibility of
most foreign nationals, who were not lawful permanent residents, for federal benefits.
However, the INA provides that those foreign nationals who do qualify for assistance
include asylees and those granted withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1641(b)(2), (b)(5) (2000) (defining “qualified alien” for the purposes of granting
federal public benefits); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(2), (b)(2) (2000) (describing the excep-
tion to the rule that qualified aliens have limited eligibility for federal public
benefits).
113 Individuals who have been granted asylum or withholding are generally eligible
for federal Section 8 housing subsidies as well as for admission into public housing as
made available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1436a(a)(3), (a)(5) (2004), the United
States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, 1715z-1
(2001), the direct loan program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1472, 1472(c)(5)(D), 1474,
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greater rights than legal permanent residents.114  Individuals with
withholding can also receive legal representation from organiza-
tions funded by the Legal Services Corporation, even though such
funding severely curtails representation of other non-citizens.115
Thus, in federal statutes concerning public benefits, Congress
has recognized that withholding is a status comparable to that of
asylum.  While these benefits have undoubtedly provided an im-
portant safety net for the many individuals who have been granted
withholding, it is unfortunate that Congress has done nothing to
assist those same individuals to obtain the most important benefit
of all, the ability to fully integrate into U.S. society by obtaining
permanent residence, and, eventually U.S. citizenship.
III. THE IMPACT OF IIRIRA ON INDIVIDUALS
FLEEING PERSECUTION
A. Background on the 1996 Changes in the Law
In 1996, Congress undertook the most sweeping change of the
Immigration and Nationality Act in years.116  IIRIRA substantially
changed asylum law by imposing, for the first time, a requirement
that foreign nationals seeking asylum submit their applications
within one year of entering the United States.117  Prior to the en-
actment of IIRIRA, the government perceived that many foreign
nationals were abusing the asylum process and filing fraudulent
claims as a means to obtain interim employment authorization.118
At that time, the backlog in processing asylum claims ran several
years.  So, hypothetically, a foreign national could have submitted a
frivolous application, obtained employment authorization and a
Social Security number, and worked for years before the applica-
1490a(a)(2)(A), 1490r (2000), subtitle A of title III of the Cranston-Gonzalez Na-
tional Affordable Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12851 (2000), and section 101 of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (West 2001).
114 Legal permanent residents who gained their status after the August 22, 1996
effective date of the PRWORA are generally prohibited from receiving SSI or Tempo-
rary Aid to Needy Families for the first five years of their status and until they have 40
qualifying quarters of work (generally ten years) in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1612(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2000).
115 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5(e) (2004).
116 Commentators have called IIRIRA “‘the harshest, most procrustean immigra-
tion control measure in [the twentieth] century.’” See Improved but Still Unfair, supra
note 4, at 1, quoting Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The
Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 371 (1999).
117 INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).
118 See Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker’s Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 625-26 (2000); Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 9
n.51.
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tion would have been adjudicated and eventually denied.119
To address this problem, Congress instituted new rules includ-
ing: (1) a prohibition on issuing employment authorization until
the application had been pending for 180 days, (2) a requirement
that applications be adjudicated within a 180-day time period, and
(3) a one-year filing deadline.120  These new fast track rules for asy-
lum applications meant that applications would either be granted
within the 180 days, or the applicant would be placed in removal
proceedings.  Shortly after the new rules went into effect, former
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner stated, “[the] INS has removed
the primary incentive for baseless asylum claims.”121
Advocates were concerned that this new rule would result in
the denial of relief to many legitimate asylum seekers.122  Congress
did recognize that there could be exceptions to the filing deadline
and created two categories of exceptions:  changed circumstances
and extraordinary circumstances.123  Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained that “the changed cir-
cumstances provision will deal with situations like those in which
. . . the applicant obtains more information about likely retribution
he or she might face if the applicant returned home . . .”124  Just
before the implementation of the new rule, which required anyone
in the United States to file by April 1, 1998 or within one year of his
last entry into the United States, the INS saw a surge in asylum
applications.  It received 5,000 more applications during the final
month of pre-deadline eligibility than during the previous
119 As Michele Pistone and Philip Schrag point out, the result of discouraging frivo-
lous asylum applications filed only to receive employment authorization could have
been achieved without imposing the one-year filing deadline.  Even before the filing
deadline was imposed, the INS had amended the regulations and prohibited asylum
applicants from receiving employment authorization until after they had won their
case.  The result was a 62% reduction in asylum applications. Id. at 9 n.51.
120 INA § 208(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(1)(iii) (2000).
121 See Legomsky, supra note 118, at 632 (citing 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 46
(1996)).
122 In a report issued by Human Rights First (then known as the Lawyers Commit-
tee on Human Rights), a review of 200 case files found that only 38% of applicants
had filed for asylum within one year of entry into the U.S. See Not Yet a Model, supra
note 96, at 271.  “Even President Clinton, when signing the IIRIRA into law, promised
to ‘correct provisions in this bill that are inconsistent with international principles of
refugee protection, including the imposition of rigid deadlines for asylum applica-
tions.’”  Ramji, supra note 111, at 141 (quoting Statement on Signing the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1938 (Sept. 30,
1996)).
123 INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
124 See Not Yet a Model, supra note 96, at 277.
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month.125  Subsequently, asylum application rates have steadily de-
clined.  In the past year, the number of affirmative asylum applica-
tions filed has fallen to 46,200 from a high of nearly 150,000 in
1995.126
B. Effects of the Changes in the Law
As discussed in Part I.A., the United States Supreme Court has
held that if an asylum applicant faces a 10% risk of persecution if
returned to her country, that risk is sufficient to warrant a grant of
asylum.127  On the other hand, to win withholding of removal, an
applicant must demonstrate that she faces a “clear probability” of
persecution if removed, or that her risk of persecution is 51% if
she is removed to her home country.128  This means that an indi-
vidual fleeing persecution, who fails to file for asylum within one
year of entering the United States or to meet an exception to the
deadline, will be denied relief even if an adjudicator finds that her
likelihood of future persecution is 40%, or even 50%.  Com-
pounding the problem is the fact that when Congress enacted
IIRIRA, it stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
determinations about exceptions to the one-year filing deadline.129
Worse yet, in 1999, Attorney General John Ashcroft implemented a
“streamlining” procedure at the BIA, reducing the traditional
three-member panel to a single adjudicator for the majority of BIA
appeals.  After these changes were made, most of the decisions is-
sued by the BIA simply affirmed immigration judges’ decisions
without any written opinion.130
125 INS Outlines Changes to Asylum Program Affecting Case Completions, Releases Stats, 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1310, 1312 (Aug. 13, 2001).
126 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 32, at 46.
127 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). See supra text accompany-
ing note 31.
128 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984).
129 INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).  As this Article was going to press, Con-
gress enacted the REAL ID Act which gives the Courts of Appeal “sole and exclusive
means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provi-
sion of [the] Act.”  INA § 242(a)5; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)5.  This Section should allow for
judicial review by the Courts of Appeal of one-year deadline issues.
130 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7).  While there have been several cases challenging the
BIA streamlining as a violation of due process, thus far courts have upheld the law.
Beth Werlin, American Immigration Law Foundation Legal Action Center Practice Advisory,
Update on BIA Affirmance Without Opinion Litigation, (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://
www.ailf.org/lac/lac_pa_120903.asp.  Even without having jurisdiction to review one
year issues in asylum cases, federal courts of appeals have been completely over-
whelmed with immigration cases following the streamlining procedure.  The Second
Circuit in 2004 estimated that 44% of its docket is comprised of immigration appeals.
In 2002, the year the BIA implemented its streamlining procedures, only 9% of the
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In 2003, the most recent year for which statistics are available,
the CIS reported that 11,221 applicants who filed affirmatively131
for asylum were placed in removal proceedings because they did
not file within one year of their arrival in the United States.132  This
is a staggeringly high figure considering that during the same year
the total number of new, affirmative applications filed was only
42,114.133  The number is especially high when considering that
these statistics do not include asylum applications filed defensively
by foreign nationals who are already in removal proceedings.  It
seems logical to conclude that a higher percentage of asylum seek-
ers would file as a defense to removal proceedings outside the one-
year deadline because defensive filings only occur when foreign na-
tionals come into contact with ICE officials who then initiate re-
moval proceedings against them.  Such applicants may have been
living in the United States for years without ever filing any applica-
tion for legal status with the U.S. government.  In these situations,
the foreign national may seek asylum despite having missed the
one-year deadline because he has no other option to avoid removal
to his country.134
Unfortunately, the asylum statistics maintained by the Execu-
tive Office of Immigration Review, the office which oversees the
immigration courts, do not track one-year filing deadline issues.  In
2003, 65,153 asylum applications were filed in immigration court.
Of these, 10,918 were granted.135  An additional 13,527 cases have
Second Circuit docket consisted of immigration appeals.  Tom Perrotta, Immigration
Appeals Surge in Second Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www/ny-
lawyer.com/news/04/11/110404b.html. See also Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass’n of the
Bar of the City of New York, The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its Impact on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, 60 THE RECORD 243 (2005), available at http://www.abcny.org/
record/2005_1/THE_SURGE_OF_IMMIGRATION_APPEALS.pdf.
131 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that asylum applications may either be filed af-
firmatively or defensively after a foreign national has been placed in removal
proceedings).
132 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 32, at 67.
133 Id. at 58.
134 On the contrary, Phillip Schrag and Michele Pistone postulate that the one-year
deadline would have a greater effect on affirmative applicants, reasoning that the
majority of defensive asylum seekers would be apprehended upon entering the
United States without proper documentation and therefore clearly be able to submit
their applications within one year of entering. See Not Yet a Model, supra note 96, at
268. However, in the post-September 11th climate, in which the DHS has emphasized
enforcement, foreign nationals are being placed in removal proceedings for even mi-
nor immigration violations.  Thus, it is more likely today than at the time the law was
passed that it affects asylum seekers who file as their only defense to removal
proceedings.
135 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
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their disposition characterized as “other.”136  Regrettably, there is
no description in the statistics of what the “other” category in-
cludes.  It is probable that the category includes grants of withhold-
ing of removal, relief under the Convention against Torture, and
voluntary departure granted when asylum is denied after trial.137
Without breaking the numbers down further, it is difficult to know
exactly how the one-year deadline has affected the outcomes in im-
migration court.  However, only one in five applicants who is un-
successful on an affirmative asylum application prevails before an
immigration judge.138
It appears that when the filing deadline was first implemented,
asylum officers were more inclined to grant exceptions to the rule.
From, April 15, 1998 (the date that enforcement of the law went
into effect) through December 27, 1998, asylum officers found ex-
ceptions in two-thirds of cases affected by the one-year deadline,
with only 33.79% of such claims (1,135 out of 3,359) being de-
nied.139  Between October 1998 and March 1999, the asylum of-
fices denied 5% of asylum claims (1,390 out of 26,865) for missing
the one-year deadline.140  By 2000, the number of asylum appli-
cants succeeding on their claims for exceptions to the one-year fil-
ing deadline had dropped dramatically.  More than half of the
applicants who had filed beyond the deadline were referred to im-
migration court without consideration of the merits of their
cases.141  Ironically, at the same time that the Asylum Officer’s Train-
COURTS FY 2003 ASYLUM STATISTICS 9 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY03AsyStats.pdf.
136 Id.
137 Foreign nationals in removal proceedings can request “voluntary departure”
meaning that they will leave the United States at their own expense by a certain date
in lieu of being deported by the U.S. government.  Procedurally this can happen in
two ways: (1) a foreign national in removal proceedings can withdraw her application
for asylum (14,482 applications were “withdrawn” in 2003, id.), and accept voluntary
departure, or (2) if the foreign national loses on the merits of his asylum application,
provided certain conditions are met, the immigration judge can grant voluntary de-
parture rather than issue a removal order. See INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2001).
If, however, the foreign national fails to depart, he shall be subjected to fines and be
ineligible for most forms of immigration relief for ten years. Id.
138 Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg for Our Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum Law’s
Failure To Protect Many of Today’s Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2004).
139 See Ramji, supra note 111, at 142 n.139.
140 Id. at 142.  Unfortunately it is not possible to tell from these statistics how many
cases were granted a one-year exception.
141 Pistone and Schrag obtained statistics from the INS Asylum Division of cases
filed between October 2000 and June 2001.  During that nine month period, asylum
officers interviewed 6,198 affirmative applicants who filed their applications beyond
the one year deadline.  More than half of these applicants, 3,141, were referred to
immigration court for missing the one year deadline, without substantive considera-
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ing Manual142 and the regulations were pointing to increased pos-
sibilities of meeting a filing deadline exception, asylum officers
appeared to have grown increasingly unwilling to grant such an
exception.143
C. Exceptions to the One Year Filing Deadline
Fortunately, the amended INA includes two categories of ex-
ceptions to the one-year filing rule.  In spite of missing the dead-
line, an individual may still be eligible for asylum if she can
demonstrate “changed conditions” or “extraordinary circum-
stances” related to the case.144
In January 1997, following passage of the IIRIRA, the INS pub-
lished proposed regulations for the legislation.  These regulations
were implemented as an interim rule in March 1997.145  Although
the period for public comments ended in July 1997, and the INS
stated its intention to issue regulations quickly, the final regula-
tions were not promulgated until December 2000.146
Before the final regulations came into effect, the INS put out
an Asylum Officer Training Manual (Officer Training Manual) with a
lesson plan on the one-year filing deadline.147  The manual was
first released in 1999, and two revised versions were issued in
2001.148  The Officer Training Manual provides useful guidance to
asylum officers, explaining how to calculate the entry date for the
one-year deadline and offering examples of fact patterns that
tion of the case. See Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 30-31.  Of the 3,057
applicants whom the asylum officers determined had met an exception to the dead-
line, 1,876 were granted asylum by the asylum officers.  The remaining applications
were denied or referred to immigration court on other grounds. Id. at 31 n.177.
142 See discussion infra note 149.
143 Pistone and Schrag note that “the percentage of late filers who are not excused
on the basis of an exceptional pigeonhole has increased steadily - from 37% in FY
1998, to 39% in FY 1999, to 42% in FY 2000, and, as noted above, to 51% most re-
cently.”  They also point out that the granting of exceptions to the one year deadline
has declined in practice even as the regulations have permitted for greater exceptions
than were initially contemplated under the statute.  They surmise, “[p]ossibly asylum
officers were reluctant, while the ink was still wet on the 1996 immigration law, to
reject asylum seekers on what was then a new and, to many, intuitively unfair basis.
But as rejections of late filers became a bureaucratic routine rather than a new and
therefore closely observed procedure, asylum officers may have become more dead-
ened to the injustice of their rejection decisions.” See Improved but Still Unfair, supra
note 4, at 31.
144 INA §208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.§1158(a)(2)(D).
145 See Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 3.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 10-11.
148 Id. at 10 n.56.
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should and should not qualify for filing deadline exceptions.149  As
discussed in Part III.D., while the Officer Training Manual is a valua-
ble tool in determining potential exceptions to the filing deadline,
it is not binding law.
D. One-Year Filing Deadline Precedent
1. Board of Immigration Appeals Review
To date, there has been only one precedential BIA case to ad-
dress the one-year issue directly, Matter of Y-C-.150  In that case, Y-C-,
a Chinese national, arrived in the United States as an unaccompa-
nied minor and was immediately detained.151  He filed for asylum
within a year of his release from detention, while he was still a mi-
nor.152  Although the asylum regulations specifically mention arriv-
ing as an unaccompanied minor as an example of the
“extraordinary circumstances” exception to the one-year deadline,
the BIA still found that an individualized inquiry as to whether Y-C-
met the exception was required.153  The Board held that since the
applicant had arrived at age 15, been detained for a year, and filed
within a year after his release, he had demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances.  The BIA also found it significant that Y-C- had been
in removal proceedings since his arrival in the United States, and
that the immigration judge could have held a hearing sooner or set
a deadline for the Y-C- to file an application.  However, the Judge
did neither of these things.154
It is unfortunate that the only case which the BIA chose to
publish as precedent155 on the one-year issue has such clear cut
149 INS, ASYLUM OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL: ONE YEAR FILING DEADLINE (Nov. 30,
2001), available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/united_states/asylum_officer_
training_oneyear_112001.pdf [hereinafter OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL].  One of the
problems with the Officer Training Manual is that it is not readily available for asylum
seekers and their representatives.  It can be found on the website of the non-profit,
www.asylumlaw.org but not on the DHS website.  An additional problem with the Of-
ficer Training Manual is that although it provides guidance for asylum officers, it is not
binding authority.  Moreover, if an asylum officer ignores the Officer Training Manual’s
instructions, and does not find a one-year exception in a case in which she should
have, that case would merely be referred to immigration court.  There, the Manual is
not binding authority for immigration judges who are not under the jurisdiction of
the CIS or even the DHS.
150 Matter of Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286 (B.I.A. 2002).
151 Id. at 288.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Although the BIA hears approximately 4,000 appeals per year, it generally pub-
lishes only around 50 decisions as precedent.  The BIA also favors publishing asylum
denial over asylum grants cases; it was not until 1987 that the BIA published an asylum
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facts.  The facts parallel the regulations156 and the Officer Training
Manual157 almost exactly.  It would have been more instructive if
the BIA had published a decision concerning facts that fall outside
of the examples already contemplated in these authorities.
2. Federal Court Review
One of the most troubling aspects of the 1996 changes to the
INA is that they stripped the federal courts of the power to review
numerous issues,158 including the failure to meet the one- year fil-
ing deadline.159  Under the INA, foreign nationals who seek to
challenge removal orders must first appeal to the BIA, and then
jurisdiction vests directly with the federal court of appeals.160
There have been several cases in which the denial of asylum claims
based on the one-year deadline were appealed to federal court.
However, in each instance, the court has found that pursuant to
the clear language of the INA,161 it lacks jurisdiction to consider
decision in which the applicant was successful in his claim. See Leitner, supra note 40,
at 696.  Some commentators have speculated that the BIA intentionally chooses not to
publish successful asylum claims to insure that each decision is reached on a case by
case basis and to avoid drawing a “blueprint” for successful claims.  Erik D.
Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual Orientation-Based Asy-
lum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, n.2 (1996).  There have been a number of
other BIA cases which address the one year issue indirectly.  See In re G-C-L, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 359 (BIA 2002); In re R-S-H, 23 I. & N. 629 (BIA 2003).  Additionally, as this
Article was going to press, the BIA issued a decision In re A-M, 231 I. & N. 737 (BIA
2005), in which the Board determined that a recent nightclub bombing in Bali did
not warrant a “changed circumstances” exception for an Indonesian Chinese appli-
cant who lived on a different island with a different religious composition from Bali.
156 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2000).
157 OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 12.
158 Other issues include: discretionary decisions by the attorney general; review of
bond determinations; and review of many removal decisions where foreign nationals
have been ordered removed because of criminal convictions. IRA KURZBAN, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 748-750 (8th ed. American Immigration Law Foundation
2002) (discussing INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2004) among others).
159 INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000).  As this Article was going to
press, the REAL ID Act was passed, substantially changing the landscape for federal
court review of removal proceedings.
160 See supra note 27.  An asylum seeker who files affirmatively while in lawful status
does not have any opportunity for appeal.  If unsuccessful after the asylum interview,
the case is over and her only chance for further review is to re-file after she falls out of
legal status.  Re-filing would then trigger removal proceedings and full appellate re-
view if she loses. See supra Part II.A. An individual who files while in lawful status
meets a regulatory exception to the one-year filing deadline. See infra Part IV.B.2.d.
161 The INA states, “No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of
the Attorney General under paragraph (2) [where paragraph 2 refers, inter alia, to the
one year filing deadline and its exceptions].”  INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)
(2000).
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the one-year deadline issue.162  However, in such cases, it should be
noted that the federal courts retain jurisdiction over claims for
withholding and relief under the Convention against Torture163
because such claims are not subject to the one-year filing deadline.
(a) Review in Federal Courts of Appeal
In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did open
the possibility of reviewing an asylum claim that might be time-
barred.  In Lanza v. Ashcroft164 the immigration judge denied an
Argentinian’s claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention against Torture.  The immigration judge
found that Lanza’s application for asylum was untimely, and that
she did not meet one of the exceptions to the one-year filing dead-
line.165  The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision with-
out opinion.166  Although the Ninth Circuit would not address the
one-year issue directly, it did find that there were two potential rea-
sons that the BIA could have upheld the denial: one was a review-
able claim as to the merits of her case and the other was an
unreviewable claim as to whether she met an exception to the fil-
ing deadline.167  Since the BIA affirmed without opinion, the court
remanded the case to the BIA for clarification rather than simply
refusing to hear the asylum appeal because the immigration judge
had found that the applicant missed the one-year deadline.168
In a similar case, Haoud v. Ashcroft,169 the First Circuit found
that when the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision with-
out opinion, the case had to be remanded for further considera-
tion.  In Haoud, as in Lanza, the applicant missed the one-year
deadline, and this was one of several reasons for the immigration
judge’s denial of the asylum application.  In both cases, the govern-
162 See Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d. 678 (7th Cir. 2004); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338
F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 544 (6th Cir.
2003); Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 318 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2003); Fahim v. INS,
278 F.3d 1216, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2002); Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir.
2001); Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2001).  In a recent decision
involving a claim for asylum and withholding by a gay man from Botswana, the Eighth
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the applicant’s claimed “extraordi-
nary circumstance” of recently “coming out.”  Molathwa v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 551 (8th
Cir. 2004).
163 Convention against Torture, supra note 49.
164 Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004).
165 Id. at 919.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 928-29.
168 Id. at 932.
169 Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003).
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ment argued that the decision was unreviewable.  Finally, the First
Circuit determined that the case had to be remanded for further
consideration as the Ninth Circuit had done in the Lanza case.170
The willingness of federal appellate courts to remand cases in
which it is unclear whether the one-year rule was the ground for
denial provides some hope to litigants.  At a minimum, the courts
of appeals have recognized that a litigant must be provided with an
explanation for the denial of an asylum claim.  Unfortunately, how-
ever, these cases may just be delaying the inevitable.  If the BIA
clarifies that its reason for affirming the immigration judge’s deci-
sion was based upon the failure to file within one year, the appli-
cant will lose the claim and the court will likely not offer further
review.
(b) Federal Habeas Review
Although the INA bars federal courts from direct review of
one-year filing deadline decisions, it may be possible to review such
decisions through habeas corpus petitions.171  In INS v. St. Cyr,172 a
Haitian man in removal proceedings was denied access to discre-
tionary relief from deportation after he had pled guilty to an aggra-
vated felony.  However, the man had entered the plea agreement
before the IIRIRA was enacted and before there was a restriction
on relief for aggravated felons.173  The INS retroactively applied
the 1996 law to his old conviction, and St. Cyr appealed to the Su-
preme Court in a habeas corpus petition.174  The INS both defended
its interpretation of IIRIRA and opposed St. Cyr’s right to use a
habeas petition to appeal its decision.175  After it granted certiorari,
the Supreme Court held that although statutory provisions might
restrict certain kinds of judicial review, matters of law through the
habeas process could not be so restricted.176  The holding of St. Cyr
170 Id. at 207-08.
171 Historically, the writ of habeas corpus has been a primary vehicle for obtaining
judicial review of immigration decisions.  28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers habeas jurisdiction
in cases where individuals are in custody of the U.S. government or under color of
government authority and in violation of their constitutional rights.  Lucas Guttentag,
The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction - Statutory Restrictions and Constitu-
tional Rights, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245, 256 (1997).
172 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
173 Id. at 293.  In addition to the imposition of the one-year filing deadline, the
1996 IIRIRA also repealed § 212(c) of the INA which had given the Attorney General
the discretion to waive the inadmissibility of certain aggravated felons like St. Cyr.
174 Id. at 293.
175 Id. at 297.
176 Id. at 314 (holding that the absence of a forum in which questions of law could
be answered “coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of
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is equally important for asylum seekers because federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over one-year filing deadline issues through
habeas petitions.
Recently, in Kanivets v. Riley, the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania found that it had habeas corpus jurisdiction over the
case of a Jewish man from Kyrgyzstan who had lost his appeal in
front of the BIA and had received a letter with a date to appear for
removal from the United States.177  One of the legal issues raised in
the habeas review was whether the immigration judge had erred178
in finding that Kanivets’s asylum application was time barred.  The
District Court found that, “[a]lthough the time limitation is not
reviewable under I.N.A. § 208(a)(3), application of the ‘changed
circumstances’ exception is a legal issue reviewable on writ of
habeas corpus, as preserved by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr.”179
The Court therefore concluded that the immigration judge had
committed legal error by failing to consider Kanivets’s changed cir-
cumstances arguments that conditions had deteriorated in
Kyrghyzstan after he had left and that it was not until his mother
apprised him of how dangerous conditions had become that he
decided to file for asylum.180  Based on this finding, the court re-
manded the case to the BIA for further proceedings.181
The importance of finding habeas jurisdiction over the legal
issue of whether an asylum applicant meets one of the statutory
exceptions to the one-year filing deadline cannot be overstated.
With the BIA increasingly deciding cases without opinion, and with
federal courts of appeals unanimously finding that they lack juris-
diction to review one-year issues, habeas proceedings may be the
only means by which an asylum applicant can seek review of an
immigration judge’s erroneous legal finding about a deadline ex-
ception.  Moreover, because of the great difference between the
burdens of proof in asylum and withholding cases, recognizing that
an asylum claim fits within an exception to the one-year filing
congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas” necessitate the
preservation of judicial review).
177 Kanivets v. Riley, 320 F. Supp. 2d 297, 298-99 (E.D. Pa. 2004) [hereinafter
Kanivets II]. See also Kanivets v. Riley, 286 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (granting a
stay of removal pending the determination of the habeas petition).
178 The BIA dismissed Kanivets’s appeal without opinion, so the federal court only
had the immigration judge’s decision to review. Kanivets, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
179 Kanivets II, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
180 Id. at 300-01.
181 Id. at 301.  Unfortunately, the Court stops short of finding that the facts
presented meet the legal standard for changed circumstances and instead remands
the case to the BIA for further proceedings to consider the possibility. Id.
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deadline often makes the difference between obtaining lawful sta-
tus in the United States and being returned to the country from
which the individual fled.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE AND ITS
EXCEPTIONS ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND HIV-
POSITIVE FOREIGN NATIONALS
A. Meeting the One-Year Filing Deadline
Applying for asylum is a complex and difficult process for any-
one.  The applicant must discuss and write out in detail the worst
experiences of her life.182  Generally the applicant will have to re-
view these experiences multiple times with an attorney, then per-
haps with an expert witness, and finally in front of an asylum
officer and/or an immigration judge.  Many asylum seekers come
to the United States with very limited financial resources, limited
English speaking abilities, and little or no knowledge of the legal
system.183  For an individual struggling to keep a roof over her
head and food on the table in a foreign land, getting to work im-
mediately on a complex, potentially expensive, and emotionally
difficult immigration application is often impossible.184
For applicants seeking asylum based on sexual orientation,
transgender identity, or HIV status, the impediments to filing
within one year are even greater.185  Many LGBT and HIV-positive
foreign nationals have no idea that they can seek asylum based on
their fear of persecution because of sexual orientation, gender
182 Many refugees suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder which makes it even
more difficult for them to relate the details of the persecution they have suffered. See
Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 49.
183 See Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 8; Ramji, supra note 111, at 143.
184 “Refugees had many different reasons for having waited for more than a year
before filing. The reasons included: ignorance of the asylum process; more urgent
needs to find family, friends, food and shelter in the United States; the inability, fol-
lowing torture and the onset of post-traumatic stress syndrome, to tell their stories to
advocates, much less official governmental authorities; the inability to pay lawyers or
locate free sources of professional assistance; the inability to obtain promptly the doc-
uments needed to file for asylum or prove a claim; and deliberate decisions to wait
before filing for asylum, hoping that conditions would change for the better and per-
mit the refugee to return home.” Not Yet a Model, supra note 96, at 271.
185 In a 1998 symposium, immigration attorney Noemi Masliah explained, “proving
that he is gay or that she is a lesbian is not enough.”  The applicant must articulate a
real fear of return to his or her country and, “for many reasons, cultural, emotional,
etc., this hurdle may be insurmountable and could require hours of guidance and
preparation, both of the application and the applicant’s eventual testimony.”  Sympo-
sium, Shifting Grounds for Asylum: Female Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 467, 500 (1998).
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identity, or HIV status.186  While many individuals around the
world are probably aware of the concept of a “refugee” and the
notion that a person who faces persecution because she holds po-
litical opinions which contradict those of her government may be
able to seek refuge in another country,187 LGBT and HIV-positive
individuals, especially those who come from particularly repressive
countries, have no way of knowing that the United States might
offer them immigration relief because of their sexual-minority or
HIV-positive status.188
Indeed, the right of LGBT and HIV-positive individuals to seek
asylum in the United States is somewhat anomalous under U.S. law.
Until 1990, homosexuality was, in and of itself, a ground of inad-
missibility to the United States.189  Furthermore, it was not until
2003 that the Supreme Court ruled that a Texas law criminalizing
private, consensual sex between members of the same sex violated
the couple’s constitutional right to privacy.190  Additionally, trans-
gender individuals, including U.S. citizens, currently have only lim-
ited rights to marry.  Likewise, they are prohibited by some states
from obtaining identity documents, such as amended birth certifi-
186 Michele Pistone and Philip Schrag state that they have personally encountered
many asylum seekers who were unaware of the possibility of applying for asylum. See
Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 26.
187 Representative Bill McCollum, one of the principal House sponsors of the bill
which amended the INA to include the filing deadline, was apparently under the
misimpression that all foreign nationals entering the United States would be in-
formed of the asylum filing deadline and how long an asylum application would take.
See Not Yet a Model, supra note 96, at 276 n.44.  Of course, immigration officials at the
airport do not give new arrivals any information about asylum generally nor do they
inform arrivals of the one-year deadline.
188 “For example, a Honduran man claiming asylum in the USA feared speaking
openly to immigration officials.  He omitted key details of the homophobic ill-treat-
ment he was fleeing because he feared that fellow inmates in the immigration deten-
tion centre would turn violent if he disclosed his sexual orientation.  The fear of
disclosure and potential breaches of confidentiality were so great that the asylum-
seeker chose to censor some of the most important supporting information for his
claim.  The claim was rejected.” AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMES OF HATE, CONSPIRACY OF SI-
LENCE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY 50 (2001), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/ai.nsf/afec99eadc40eff880256e8f0060197c/dc31f264
b72fabf280256a48003c810c/$FILE/lgbt.pdf.
189 See RUTHANN ROBSON, Lesbians and Immigration, in LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 101, 101-05 (1992).  In other words, if a foreign national had
an independent means of obtaining legal permanent residence, such as through a
petition by a United States citizen parent, the application would be denied if the INS
became aware of the applicant’s sexual orientation.  This was because the individual
was deemed to have a “psychopathic personality” or suffer from the affliction of “sex-
ual deviation.” See also KURZBAN, supra note 158, at 40; Leitner, supra note 40, at 686.
190 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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cates, which match their corrected sex.191  At the same time, the
United States continues to have one of the world’s most restrictive
immigration policies towards HIV-positive foreign nationals.  To-
day, the United States bars their entrance as non-immigrants ex-
cept under the most limited circumstances, and denies their
applications for legal permanent residence unless they meet nar-
row waiver eligibility criteria.192  Against this backdrop of curtailed
rights for LGBT and HIV-positive citizens and foreign nationals, it
is not surprising that many new entrants into the United States may
be unaware of the possibility of seeking refuge on account of their
sexual minority or HIV status.193
LGBT and HIV-positive foreign nationals may face the addi-
tional barrier of being “closeted” within their own communities
even once they reach the United States.  Many foreign nationals
who arrive in the United States seek out assistance from the ex-
tended ethnic and social communities to which they belonged in
their home country.  Individuals who have no other option for low-
cost housing may stay with family or friends of relatives.  Many
LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers are not “out” to their fami-
lies in their own countries due to shame, deeply rooted social
taboos, or fear for their physical safety.  Therefore, they often con-
tinue to live a life of secrecy once they reach the United States.
The fear and danger they experienced at home is transferred to
their new lives in the United States within their insular communi-
ties, especially during their first year here.194
191 Shannon Minter, Representing Transsexual Clients:  Selected Legal Issues, National
Center for Lesbian Rights (2004), available at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/
tgclients.htm.
192 See INA § 212(a)(1)A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) (2000) and INA § 212(g)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(g)(1) (2000).  To qualify for a waiver of the HIV ground of inadmissi-
bility, a foreign national must have an immediate relative (generally, an opposite sex
spouse, parent or child) who is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident, and must
demonstrate that: the danger she poses to the public health is minimal; the possibility
of the spread of the disease by her admission is minimal; and no cost will be incurred
by any government agency in the United States without the agency’s prior consent.
INS Memorandum from Johnny N. Williams, Executive Associate Commissioner, Of-
fice of Field Operations, to Regional Directors et al., Medical Examinations, Vaccination
Requirements, Waivers of Medical Grounds of Inadmissibility, and Designation of Civil Sur-
geons and Revocation of Such Designation, HQ 70/21/1.1-P AD 0103 (Oct. 17, 2002) (on
file with the Immigration Equality), available at http://www.immigrationequality.org/
uploadedfiles/2002%20HIV%20Immigration%20policy%20memo.pdf.  An HIV waiv-
er based on humanitarian grounds is available to asylees and refugees.
193 “Many refugees and their legal representatives are not aware that the option of
filing an asylum claim on the grounds of persecution because of their sexual orienta-
tion is available to them.” AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 188, at 50.
194 Even for sexual minorities who are not newcomers to the United States, there is
often a struggle between a desire to “assimilate” into the dominant culture and a
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Additionally, it is not uncommon for an LGBT or HIV-positive
foreign national’s only contact with an immigration attorney to be
with an attorney who is originally from the same country as the
applicant.  The members of the applicant’s community in the
United States are often his only source of immigration information
and they are likely to recommend legal counsel with someone with
whom they are familiar.  In such situations, the foreign national
may be afraid to disclose his sexual orientation or HIV status, and it
may never occur to the attorney to ask about those subjects.195  In-
deed, even assuming that an attorney is aware of the possibility of
filing an asylum application based on sexual minority or HIV sta-
tus, the attorney might worry about offending the client by even
broaching the subject.  This is particularly likely in situations where
the client comes from a culture where homosexuality, transgender
identity, and HIV-positive status are severely stigmatized.
B. Application of the Filing Deadline Exceptions to Asylum Claims
Based on LGBT and HIV-Positive Status
As discussed above, the primary reason that LGBT and HIV-
positive foreign nationals miss the one-year filing deadline is be-
cause they are unaware of the possibility of applying for asylum at
all.  Unfortunately, lack of awareness does not qualify as one of the
exceptions to the one-year deadline.196  How then do the two ex-
isting categories of filing deadline exceptions, “changed circum-
stances” and “extraordinary circumstances,” apply to LGBT and
HIV-positive asylum seekers?  The regulations expound on the two
exceptions by providing examples that would satisfy them.  How-
ever, the examples provided are not intended to be exhaustive.  Al-
though neither the regulations nor the Officers Training Manual list
any examples of exceptions which are specific to LGBT or HIV-
based cases, some of the examples are particularly relevant to
LGBT and HIV-based claims.
desire to resist assimilation. See generally Ruthann Robson, Introduction: Assimilation
and/or Resistance?, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 631 (2003). For LGBT foreign nationals
who have just arrived in the United States, it is easy to see why they would, at least
initially, favor blending into the dominant community.
195 The Author has met with many LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers who have
related the above factual scenarios to her.
196 See infra Part IV.B.2.f. and Conclusion for an argument which could encompass
lack of awareness as an exception.
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1. Application of the Changed Circumstances Exception
(a) Changed Country Conditions
The first example of “changed circumstances” listed in the
regulations is for “changes in conditions in the applicant’s country
of nationality.”197  This example could encompass situations where
the government has recently criminalized sexual activity between
members of the same sex or where a government has recently in-
creased enforcement of existing laws.  For example, the Egyptian
government recently began a systematic crackdown against gay es-
tablishments which has resulted in the arrest, trial, and imprison-
ment of scores of Egyptian gay men.198  Another example involves
the rise in prominence of Sharia law in Nigeria.  Under this law, an
arrest warrant was recently issued for a gay man who potentially
faces the sentence of death by stoning.199  These dramatic changes
in the law or in the enforcement of the law would seem to satisfy
the changed conditions exception to the deadline.
Of course, as the BIA demonstrated in Matter of Y-C-,200 there
are no automatic exceptions to the deadline and each case must be
analyzed individually.  Thus, even in the case of an Egyptian who
has missed the one-year deadline and claims changed country con-
ditions, there are potential problems.  If the applicant was perse-
cuted in the past, an adjudicator might wonder why the worsened
conditions warrant a finding of changed conditions if the abuse he
underwent in the past sufficed to make out a claim for asylum.201
If, on the other hand, the applicant did not suffer past persecution,
and is therefore basing his claim entirely on the fear of future per-
secution because of the recent reports of attacks on gay men, it will
be more difficult for him to prove his case.  Although asylum law
197 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A) (2004).
198  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN A TIME OF TORTURE:  THE ASSAULT ON JUSTICE IN
EGYPT’S CRACKDOWN ON HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT (2004), available at http://www.hr.
org/reports/2004/egypt0304/.
199 Man Faces Death by Stoning for Gay Sex, at http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/
11/11290nigeria.htm (Nov. 29, 2004).
200 See Matter of Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286 (B.I.A. 2002).
201 In fact, the Asylum Officer Training Manual cites the following example:
Applicant is a member of the XYZ party in his country.  He is briefly
jailed in September 1999.  He arrives in the U.S. in November 1999 and
files for asylum in December 2000. On the day of the interview, XYZ
members are still routinely being jailed. Because there has been no
change of country conditions, the application will be referred provided
no other exceptions apply. Note: If conditions for XYZ members wors-
ened after applicant departed his country, he may be eligible for the
changed circumstance exception.
OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 8-9.
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allows for the possibility of winning asylum based solely on fear of
future persecution,202 it is much more difficult to prove that some-
thing may happen in the future than to prove that it has already
happened in the past.  Moreover, as a practical matter, it is easier
to present a compelling narrative of past mistreatment than to rely
entirely on country condition reports for a claim based on a fear of
future mistreatment.
(b) Changes in the Applicant’s Circumstances
The regulations also allow for an exception based on “changes
in the applicant’s circumstances that materially affect the appli-
cant’s eligibility for asylum including . . . activities the applicant
becomes involved in outside the country of feared persecution that
place the applicant at risk.”203  This exception may be the most rel-
evant for LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers because it could
encompass “coming out” as a lesbian or gay man, “transitioning” as
a transgender man or woman, or learning of one’s HIV-positive
status.  One of the examples listed in the Officers Training Manual is
an “applicant’s conversion from one religion to another, or aban-
donment of religion altogether.”204  This situation could be analo-
gized to an applicant who has recently “converted” from being
HIV-negative to being HIV-positive. Although it is difficult to win
asylum based on HIV-positive status alone,205 a gay or transgender
individual who had some fear of returning to her country in the
past may find that her fear has been greatly exacerbated by an HIV
diagnosis.206
Although most homosexual and transgender individuals
would not characterize their “coming out” experience as changing
from heterosexual to homosexual or as changing from one gender
to another, the lengthy process of coming to terms with one’s iden-
tity is not unlike that of religious conversion.  Moreover, for some
applicants who come from countries where one conservative relig-
ion predominates, discovery of a minority sexual orientation or
transgender identity may require the individual to leave his or her
religious faith which could lead to further negative conse-
202 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2004).
203 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B) (2004).
204 OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 10.
205 See On the Positive Side, supra note 55.
206 It is possible to put forward an asylum application based on more than one
ground.  Thus, while grants based on HIV-positive status alone are uncommon, grants
based on sexual orientation combined with HIV-positive status occur frequently.
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quences.207  For applicants from countries where homosexuality is
taboo, it may take a long time for an individual to even accept the
label of homosexual for herself and even longer to be able to dis-
cuss her sexual orientation with strangers, particularly those who
are employed by the government.208
Of course “coming out” has many meanings.  It may simply
entail accepting personal sexual identity, but it may also include
being open with others about a sexual orientation.  Thus, one sce-
nario in which an individual might warrant an exception to the
deadline would be when the individual “comes out” to her family
and faces threats as a result.209
For a transgender individual, it may take a substantial period
of time before she feels comfortable enough to take steps to ana-
207 For example, the Author represents a gay man from a Muslim country who,
after numerous incidents of abuse by community members and religious leaders, has
abandoned the Muslim faith and is now a practicing Christian.  This religious conver-
sion may have even more serious consequences than his sexual orientation if he is
returned to his country.
208 In one case, the pro se asylum applicant did not have the language to appropri-
ately identify his sexual orientation.  The following is a direct quotation from the
transcript where the attorney for DHS questioned an asylum seeker from Jamaica:
Q: Do you know the difference between homosexual and bisexual?
A: Huh?
Q: Do you know the difference –
A: Yeah.
Q: – between being a homosexual and being bisexual?
A. Yes.
Q: What’s the difference?
A: Homosexual is like a man and another man.
Q: And bisexual is?
A: It’s like almost like the same I guess.
Judge: Bisexual is also a man and another man?
A: Yeah, like two gay people.
Transcript from June 20, 2003 Immigration Court proceedings at 23, Matter of L-R-
(B.I.A. 2003) (unpublished decision, on file with Immigration Equality). See also AM-
NESTY INT’L, supra note 188, at 49-52.  Unfortunately, in a recent case in which a gay
man from Botswana claimed that he did not file within one year of his arrival in the
United States because he did not want to accept his sexual orientation and he was
unaware that his sexual orientation could be the basis of an asylum claim, the immi-
gration judge held that he did not meet an exception to the one-year filing deadline.
The Eighth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review this finding but upheld
the judge’s finding that Molathwa did not prove that it was “more likely than not” that
he would suffer future persecution so as to warrant a grant of withholding.  Molathwa
v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 551, 554 (8th Cir. 2004).
209 One of the sponsors of the law enacting the one-year filing deadline, Senator
Hatch, stated: “the changed circumstances provision will deal with situations like
those in which . . . the applicant obtains more information about likely retribution he
or she might face if the applicant returned home . . . .”  Beth Lyon, Fighting a Deadline
on Fear:  Asylum Practice Update as the One-Year Deadline Approaches, 75 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 285, 288-89 (1998) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S11840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)).
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tomically “transition” into her true gender identity.  Additionally, if
a transgender applicant undergoes medical interventions such as
hormone therapy, electrolysis, or surgery, she may feel a much
greater fear of being forced to return to her country than she did
before.  The medical interventions may make it impossible for her
to pass as the gender by which she was known before she left her
country, and she may be at much greater risk of persecution after
taking irrevocable steps to bring her anatomical sex in line with
her gender identity.210  It is important to note that under the “ex-
traordinary circumstances” exception to the one-year filing dead-
line an applicant must demonstrate that the “circumstances were
not intentionally created by the alien through his or her own ac-
tion or inaction,”211 but there is no such requirement under the
“changed circumstances” exception.212  Hence, an applicant
should not be at risk of falling outside the “changed circumstance”
exception simply because her own action (such as undergoing a
medical sex transition) caused the changed circumstances.
The changed conditions exception also encompasses individu-
als whose “activities” in the United States might put them at risk.213
This may include applicants who have become active in LGBT
rights or HIV education in the United States or those who have
participated in gay pride events.  Such foreign nationals sometimes
fear that news of their identity has reached their country, perhaps
from members of their tightly-knit community in the United States
or from the media attention which they have received.214
210 If an applicant has completed sex reassignment and her outward appearance
matches her gender identity, a practitioner should be prepared to address an adjudi-
cator’s questions about how potential persecutors in her country would know that she
is transgender.  Answers to these questions could include that her family would know
and would seek to harm her; that the gender notation on her identity documents
would not match her current appearance; or that in her culture she would be ex-
pected to marry and have children and she would be at risk of severe physical harm
when her transgender identity became known to potential romantic partners or
spouses.
211 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (2004).
212 Fortunately, the Asylum Officer Training Manual further clarifies the require-
ment, stating that the applicant must “not have intentionally created the extraordi-
nary circumstance, through his or her action or inaction, for the purpose of establishing a
filing-deadline exception.” OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 11 (emphasis
added).  The interpretation leaves open the possibility that the exception came about
because of the applicant’s actions, but only holds the actions against the applicant if
their purpose was to create an exception to the filing deadline. Id.
213 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B) (2004).
214 The Author is currently working with a man who missed the one-year filing
deadline but who was recently seen by his cousin walking hand-in-hand with his same-
sex partner in Greenwich Village.  The applicant now fears returning to his country
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2. Application of the Extraordinary Circumstances
Exception
(a) Illness or Disability
The other category of exceptions to the deadline in the INA is
for “extraordinary circumstances.”  The regulations define ex-
traordinary circumstances as “events or factors directly related to
the failure to meet the one-year deadline.”215  This definition en-
compasses a range of occurrences which may have prevented the
applicant from filing within a year of her entry into the United
States.
The first such circumstance contemplated by the regulations is
for “serious illness or mental or physical disability, including any
effects of persecution or violent harm suffered in the past, during
the 1-year period after arrival.”216  It is easy to see how this excep-
tion might apply to an individual who is HIV-positive.  An HIV-posi-
tive foreign national, particularly one who comes from a country
without advanced HIV treatment options, may be very ill when he
arrives in the United States and may spend his first year or longer
trying to stabilize his health.  Likewise, it is easy to envision circum-
stances where an individual is diagnosed with HIV within a year of
his arrival in the United States, and then suffers from debilitating
depression as a result of being diagnosed with an incurable and
potentially fatal disease.
The “mental disability” exception may be the one most com-
monly used in asylum applications because so many asylum appli-
cants suffer from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
depression, or other mental health issues as a result of the persecu-
tion they have endured.217  Since mental health diagnoses are
more subjective than any of the other one-year exceptions, this ex-
ception may be subject to overuse.218
because his entire family has become aware of his sexual orientation through his
cousin’s disclosure.
215 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (2004).
216 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i) (2004).
217 See Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 14.
218 On one occasion the Author was giving a presentation to asylum officers on
LGBT and HIV-based asylum claims, and one officer stated that he was tired of post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claims.  The officer cited an example of an applicant
who had been in the United States for close to ten years, completed his Ph.D., and
then suddenly claimed a PTSD diagnosis.  Because adjudicators view PTSD claims
with jaded eyes, it is very important to carefully document legitimate claims of PTSD
or depression.  An adjudicator is much more likely to credit testimony from a psychia-
trist or therapist who has an ongoing relationship with the applicant than from a
mental health professional who has only met the applicant once and who has written
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For LGBT applicants, in addition to the potential mental
health effects of the trauma they suffered in their own countries,
they may find it difficult or impossible to come to terms with their
sexual orientation or gender identity until after they have lived in
the United States and undergone counseling for a substantial pe-
riod of time.  Moreover, applicants from countries where homosex-
uality is deeply stigmatized may experience severe depression as
they “come out” to themselves.219  In such cases, the “extraordinary
circumstances” exception may be closely linked to the “changes in
the applicant’s circumstances” exception.  That is, an applicant
who accepts the “changed circumstance” of her sexual orientation
may lead her to suffer the “extraordinary circumstance” of a
mental health problem.
(b) Unaccompanied Minors
Another exception which is clearly delineated in the regula-
tions is for unaccompanied minors.220  Some commentators have
argued that because the regulations also create an exception for
those with “legal disabilities,” all minors should be granted a filing
deadline exception, even those who are “accompanied.”221  This
distinction may be significant for LGBT youth because they may
not be open with their families about their sexual orientation, and
therefore may be unable to pursue an asylum claim based on their
sexual orientation or gender identity until they are older and no
longer living with potentially hostile family members.222
an evaluation solely for the purpose of bolstering the asylum application based on the
single consultation.
219 The Author worked with one client from Indonesia who continued having feel-
ings of shame about his sexual orientation long after he came out to himself.  He
found the word “gay” to be deeply offensive and instead preferred to refer to himself
as “homosexual.”
220 The BIA has held that each case, even those clearly fitting within the regulations
excepting unaccompanied minors, must be adjudicated on a case by case basis. See
Matter of Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286 (B.I.A. 2002).
221 Lee Berger & Davina Figeroux, Protecting Accompanied Child Refugees from the One-
year Deadline:  Minority as a Legal Disability, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 859 (2002).
222 A practitioner told the Author about a case in which an entire family was placed
in removal proceedings after complying with special registration.  After meeting with
the teenage son apart from the family, the practitioner was able to determine that he
was gay and had a viable claim for asylum based on his sexual orientation.  In this
example, even though the applicant was “accompanied” by his family, they were una-
ware of his sexual orientation, and he had thus been unable to pursue his options
under the immigration law.
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(c) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Another exception which could affect LGBT and HIV-positive
asylum seekers is based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.223
The regulations specify stringent conditions, which are derived
from a BIA case on this issue, to meet the ineffective assistance
exception.224  The regulations require that: the applicant must
write a detailed affidavit explaining the deficiencies of the repre-
sentation; must notify the attorney against whom the allegations
are being made; and must explain whether a complaint has been
filed with the relevant disciplinary committee, and if not, why
not.225  Essentially, an asylum applicant must allege a colorable
claim of malpractice in order to succeed under this exception.
As discussed above, many attorneys are not aware that sexual
orientation, transgender identity, or HIV status can form the basis
of an asylum claim.226  Even if an attorney is aware that these
grounds exist, if she does not regularly work with the affected com-
munities, it would probably not occur to her to discuss these issues
with a client.  This problem is complicated further by the fact that
some clients may be afraid to reveal their sexual orientation, gen-
der identity, or HIV status to an attorney.  This is especially the case
if the attorney comes from the foreign national’s ethnic commu-
nity because the applicant may fear that her status will become
known within that community.227  While an attorney’s failure to ask
about particular grounds for asylum would certainly be unfortu-
nate and might be the result of less than thorough lawyering, it
would be difficult to advise a client to file an ethical complaint
against an attorney for failing to spot an issue that the client did
not seem to raise.  On the other hand, many unscrupulous lawyers
will represent asylum seekers on claims which are barely colorable
and without fully explaining the consequences of having an appli-
cation denied.228  Thus, depending on the facts of the particular
223 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iii) (2004).
224 Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.
1988).
225 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iii)(A)-(C) (2004).
226 See supra Part IV.A.
227 The Author has met with numerous clients who were afraid to tell their original
immigration attorney that they had tested positive for HIV.  The Author has also met
with numerous clients whose prior attorneys filed a colorable but weak asylum case
based on political opinion when the client had a much stronger claim based on sex-
ual orientation.  These clients had never even discussed their sexual orientation with
their former attorneys.
228 Of course, ineffective assistance of counsel alone would not result in the finding
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case, this exception may be the only hope for some applicants to
gain status.
(d) Maintaining Lawful Non-Immigrant Status
The regulations also provide that maintaining lawful immi-
grant or non-immigrant status and filing within a reasonable time
after that status ends constitutes an exception to the filing dead-
line.229  This is another important category of exceptions for LGBT
asylum applicants.  Many young men and women discover their
sexual orientation or gender identity during their student years.
An asylum seeker’s ability to wait until his student status expires
before filing for asylum may be critical because it could allow him
to reach a point where he is comfortable enough with his sexual
identity to file for asylum.
This exception is also extremely important to applicants with a
student or work visa who have HIV.  Foreign nationals who are
HIV-positive are generally barred from obtaining legal permanent
residence because of their HIV status.230  Since lesbians and gay
men are unable to enter into marriages which are recognized by
the U.S. federal government,231 many foreign nationals who wish
to remain in the United States to be with American partners, at-
tempt to do so through employment-based sponsorship or through
the diversity visa lottery.  However, even if an HIV-positive foreign
national obtains the ability to apply for legal permanent residence
status through either of these routes, the application will be denied
once CIS discovers that he is HIV positive.  In these circumstances,
if the individual comes from a country where he faces persecution
because of his sexual orientation and/or HIV-positive status, the
one-year filing exception could prove crucial.232  Rather than pur-
suing legal permanent residence through employment or the di-
of an exception to the deadline if the poorly prepared application was filed more
than a year after the applicant arrived in the United States.
229 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iv) (2004).
230 INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
231 The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines marriages for federal
purposes as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife.”  1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).  Thus even same-sex couples who are lawfully married in
Massachusetts or Canada will not have their marriages recognized for immigration
purposes because immigration is entirely governed by federal law.
232 The Author has met with many individuals who have held H1B, skilled worker
visas for several years and did not discover until their labor certifications for legal
permanent residence were approved that their HIV-positive status would prevent
them from obtaining legal permanent residence.  In fact, their HIV status makes such
individuals ineligible for H1B status too.  However, unlike legal permanent residence
applications, no medical exam is required for a temporary, non-immigrant visa.
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versity visa lottery, a foreign national could submit his asylum
application within a reasonable period of time after the expiration
of his student or work visa.
(e) Death or Serious Illness of Legal Representative or Family
Member
The final provision in the “extraordinary circumstances” regu-
lations233 allows an exception to the filing deadline for individuals
who have had their legal representative or a close family member
die or suffer serious illness.234  Under this exception, CIS has taken
an expansive view of family.  Under federal law, however, marriages
between same-sex partners are not cognizable.235  Additionally, the
Department of Homeland Security has recently taken the position
that it will not grant immigration petitions based on marriages
where one of the spouses is transgender.236  In light of these devel-
opments, it would be interesting to see whether same-sex mar-
riages237 or other long-term, same-sex relationships might be
recognized under this exception.
The Officers Training Manual explains that the “degree of inter-
action between the family members, as well as the blood relation-
ship between applicant and the family member must be
considered.  For example, an estranged brother with whom the ap-
plicant has never had much contact would not qualify, but a grand-
parent or uncle for whom the applicant has sole physical
responsibility would qualify.”238  Because there are no provisions of
the INA which specifically recognize the relationship of uncle and
no provisions under which a niece or nephew could derive benefits
233 There is one other enumerated exception in the regulations for timely filing
with the application rejected for a technical defect such as leaving a box on the form
blank.  8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(v) (2004).  Since this exception does not raise any is-
sues specific to LGBT or HIV claims it is not discussed in this Article.
234 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(vi) (2004).
235 See DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, supra at note 231.
236 U.S. CIS Interoffice Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for
Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Adjudication of Petitions and
Applications Filed by or on Behalf of, or Document Requests by, Transsexual Individuals
HQOPRD 70/6 (April 16, 2004) (on file with Immigration Equality), available at
http://www.immigrationequality.org/uploadedfiles/Yates%20april%2004%20trans%
20marriage.pdf. But see In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. 746 (BIA 2005), upholding the
validity of a marriage where one spouse was transgender and the marriage was validly
entered into in the state in which they resided, North Carolina.
237 It is now legally possible for same-sex couples to marry in Massachusetts, most of
Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands. See Canada Court Okays Same Sex Unions, CBS
NEWS, Dec. 9, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/09/world
/main660070.shtml.
238 OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 12.
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from an uncle,239 the Officers Training Manual is articulating that
for the purposes of this exception, it is the individualized assess-
ment of the relationship which is significant, not the existence of a
legal familial relationship with an individual who dies or suffers
from a serious illness.240
(f) Other Circumstances
The Officers Training Manual also leaves room for the possibil-
ity of “other circumstances” which are not enumerated in the regu-
lations.  The Officers Training Manual states:
other circumstances that are not specifically listed in the non-
exclusive list in the regulations, but which may constitute ex-
traordinary circumstances, depending on the facts of the case,
include severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation
within a refugee community, profound language barriers, or
profound difficulties in cultural acclimatization.  Any such fac-
tor or group of factors must have had a severe enough impact
on the alien’s functioning to have produced a significant barrier
239 In one context where expanded family members are recognized under immi-
gration law, the United States rejected recognition of same-sex partners.  Under the
Safe Third Country Agreement which the United States and Canada implemented on
December 29, 2004, a potential asylum applicant must file her application in which-
ever of the two countries she arrived first.  Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of Canada for Cooperation in the
Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Dec. 5,
2002, U.S.-Can., available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/Safe3rd_finaltext12-
5-021.pdf. However, there are various exceptions to this rule including the ability to
file in the second country if the applicant has family members there who are citizens
or residents of the country.  For this purpose, family is broadly defined to include:
spouse, son, daughter, parent, legal guardian, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, aunt,
uncle, niece, or nephew.  Implementation of the Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding
Asylum Claims Made in Transit and at Land Border Ports-of-Entry, 69 Fed. Reg.
69,480 (Nov. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 212, 235); Asylum Claims
Made by Aliens Arriving From Canada at Land Border Ports-of-Entry, 69 Fed. Reg.
69,490 (Nov. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208, 1213, 1235, 1240).
While Canada also recognizes same-sex spouses and conjugal partners (romantic part-
ners who reside together) of either sex for the exception, the United States explicitly
rejected recognition of same-sex partners in implementing the treaty because of
DOMA.  The U.S. commentary to the regulation states that although “valid foreign
marriages, including common law marriages, are generally given effect under U.S.
immigration law . . . [the DOMA] precludes use of the terms ‘marriage’ or ‘spouse’ to
refer to same sex partnerships.”  Implementation of the Agreement Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding
Asylum Claims Made in Transit and at Land Border Ports-of-Entry, 69 Fed. Reg.
69,482.
240 While there is no provision of the INA specifically granting benefits based on an
uncle-nephew/niece relationship, there is also no law, comparable to the DOMA,
which explicitly forbids federal recognition of the relationship.
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to timely filing.241
This exception could have particular relevance for LGBT or HIV-
positive applicants who are severely isolated because of their sex-
ual-minority status or HIV status and are unable to avail themselves
of resources which may be available within their ethnic community.
It may be possible to further expand this catchall portion of
the “extraordinary circumstances” exception.  As noted above, it is
probably more common for LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers
to lack awareness that their sexual orientation, gender identity, or
HIV status could be a ground for asylum than it is for applicants
applying based on more traditional grounds such as political opin-
ion or race.242  Although the regulations do not provide an excep-
tion to the deadline based on lack of awareness of asylum law,243
this catchall provision in the Officers Training Manual could poten-
tially include lack of awareness of the deadline.244
3. Filing within a Reasonable Time of the Changed or
Extraordinary Circumstances
An applicant who presents an acceptable exception to the one-
year filing deadline faces the added burden of demonstrating that
he has filed within “a reasonable period given those circum-
stances.”245  However, neither the statute nor the regulations de-
fine “reasonable period.”  The Officers Training Manual only
explains that the officer should take into account the particular
facts of the case, including the “applicant’s education and level of
sophistication, the amount of time it takes to obtain legal assis-
241 OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 14-15.
242 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
243 Pistone and Schrag point out that the earlier version of the Asylum Officer Train-
ing Manual gave an example of missing the deadline which appeared to allow for the
possibility of lack of awareness qualifying as an exception.  The old manual stated,
“‘[t]he credibility of an applicant’s unawareness of asylum should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis . . . .’” Improved but Still Unfair, supra note 4, at 26-27 n.155.  Pistone
and Schrag state that this implies “that if the adjudicator is convinced that the appli-
cant is telling the truth, the belated discovery will justify an exception to the dead-
line.” Id.  However, the 2001 version of the Officer Training Manual eliminated this
example.
244 Philip Schrag and Michele Pistone argue in their 1997 article that lack of aware-
ness of the ability to file for asylum should constitute an exception to the filing dead-
line.  They suggest that an applicant claiming such an exception should have to bear
the burden of proof.  An applicant could do this by demonstrating the date upon
which he learned about the law through submission of affidavits by attorneys or
human rights groups who first informed him about asylum. See Not Yet a Model, supra
note 96, at 276.  Unfortunately, CIS does not generally accept lack of awareness of
asylum as an exception to the filing deadline.
245 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (2004); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii) (2004).
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tance, any effects of persecution and/or illness, when the applicant
became aware of the changed circumstance, and any other relevant
factors . . . .”246  Since the filing deadline itself is one year, a practi-
tioner should generally assume that filing more than a year after
the triggering circumstance would be considered unreasonable247
unless there were some subsequent circumstance that constituted
an exception.  For example, an applicant might succeed in demon-
strating a “changed circumstance” by proving that she learned that
she was HIV positive 18 months ago.  It might then be possible for
her to show an “extraordinary circumstance” exception if she were
either very ill or suffered from severe depression following her
diagnosis.
Essentially an applicant must account for the time period from
when she entered the United States until the time that she filed,
and explain the delay in filing.  In effect, the need to file within a
“reasonable period” often militates against filing even if the appli-
cant had a cognizable exception during the first year, if the appli-
cant cannot adequately explain the subsequent delay in filing.
4. For Attorneys the Deadline Adds Challenges in
Evaluating Asylum Cases
For attorneys, the one-year rule has added new dimensions of
complexity to evaluating asylum cases.  The exceptions to the rule
are so narrow that it is difficult to imagine a factual scenario in
which an individual has missed the one-year deadline and an attor-
ney could confidently advise that client that she would be likely to
succeed.248  Assisting an applicant to file a claim which is likely to
land him in removal proceedings is a frightening position for an
attorney.  Moreover, as discussed previously, if an applicant cannot
demonstrate an exception to the one-year asylum rule, her attor-
ney must be sure that she understands the possibility of winning
withholding, and the limitations of that status.249
One of the unexpected consequences of the harsh one-year
rule is that the stakes have become even higher for practitioners
who are helping clients who have been in the United States for less
246  OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 149, at 16.
247 The Author has appeared in front of immigration judges who have interpreted
the “reasonable period” to mean a one-year filing deadline after a foreign national
who was previously in lawful status was placed in removal proceedings.
248 Of course, there are many cases where applicants who miss the deadline do
succeed, but the exceptions are so narrow and so unevenly applied that the accurate
prediction of an outcome in a specific case is exceedingly difficult.
249 See supra Part II.C-D.
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than one year to determine whether to file for asylum.  An attorney
must assist a client in thoroughly evaluating the merits of her po-
tential asylum claim.  Even a weak asylum claim is much stronger
within the first year than it is when the applicant must also demon-
strate an exception to the filing deadline.
Attorneys must also be aware of the serious malpractice issues
raised by representing individuals in asylum cases.  An attorney
who advises a client with a weak claim not to file may find himself
the subject of a complaint lodged by the former client as she tries
to meet the “ineffective assistance” exception to the deadline.250
On the other hand, an attorney who assists an applicant to file a
weak application could also face claims of malpractice as the appli-
cant goes from the bad position of being undocumented to the
worse position of facing removal from the United States.  Clearly,
the 1996 changes to the INA have raised the stakes in asylum law
for attorneys as well as for asylum seekers.
CONCLUSION
Though there is a general belief that the attacks of September
11, 2001 were responsible for the current focus on immigration
enforcement, it was the radical 1996 changes to the INA which be-
gan the current onslaught against foreign nationals.  Before the en-
actment of the one-year filing deadline, it was only applicants who
did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion under asylum law,
such as those with criminal records, who would be granted with-
holding status in place of asylum.  However, the implementation of
the one-year deadline has created a new, and perhaps unexpected,
class of individuals who are forever trapped in the United States in
the limbo status of withholding of removal.  Worse yet, those sad-
dled with withholding are the “lucky” ones.  There may be many
thousands of deserving foreign nationals who were returned to the
countries from which they fled even though they could have estab-
lished a “well-founded fear” of future persecution, but who were
unable to meet the heightened “more likely than not” probability
of future persecution which is required for a grant of withholding.
Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, the primary reason that an
individual would be granted withholding rather than asylum was if
the applicant was a member of “one of the undesirable groups de-
scribed [in the INA.]”251 That is, foreign nationals could be prohib-
ited from meriting a favorable exercise of discretion if, for
250 See supra Part IV.B.2(c).
251 Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 18 (B.I.A. 1981).
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example, they engaged in criminal or terrorist activities.  It does
not seem unreasonable to grant such individuals a lesser status
than asylees.  But for individuals who have been found to legiti-
mately fear returning to their countries, and whose only “undesir-
able” attribute was lack of awareness of or inability to comply with
the one-year filing deadline, the consequences of a life in withhold-
ing status are manifestly unfair.
For too long, Congress and anti-immigration groups have
viewed those fleeing persecution as undeserving and undesir-
able.252  They have perceived asylum seekers as trying to circum-
vent U.S. immigration laws to gain better economic opportunities
here, or, more recently, as trying to gain entry into the United
States in order to harm American citizens.253  This hostility towards
our most vulnerable immigrants not only contradicts our obliga-
tions under international law, it also contradicts the principles
upon which the United States was founded.  Those fleeing persecu-
tion should be welcomed into American society and given the legal
means to become full participants in it as quickly as possible.
Although the United States has a legitimate interest in weed-
ing out fraudulent asylum applications, the one-year deadline is
unnecessary to further that interest.  The most effective deterrents
to asylum fraud were the implementation of the 180-day waiting
252 The anti-immigration organization Federation for American Immigration Re-
form (FAIR) is calling upon the 109th Congress to reform asylum procedures.  Claim-
ing that “our policies in recent years have reflected political considerations in this
country, rather than political oppression in the countries from which the refugees
and asylees have come,” FAIR states that the grounds for asylum should be limited to
“race, ethnicity, religion or political belief.”  Thus, FAIR would eliminate the particu-
lar social group category which would eliminate, among other things, sexual orienta-
tion, transgender identity, and HIV status-based asylum claims.  FAIR, An Immigration
Reform Agenda for the 109th Congress, at http://www.fairus.org/ImmigrationIssueCen-
ters/ImmigrationIssueCenters.cfm?ID=2613&c=12 (Jan. 2005).
253 Representative James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, the current Chair of the in-
fluential House Judiciary Committee, has stated in Congressional debate that asylum
laws need to be tightened and further corroborative evidence must be gathered from
applicants because “[m]any terrorist aliens have applied for asylum and then been
released from detention to plot or commit their crimes.” Sensenbrenner Statement Dur-
ing House Floor Debate on 9/11 Legislation Conference Report, at http://judiciary.house.
gov/newscenter.aspx?A=425 (Dec. 7, 2004).  Of course, Representative Sensenbren-
ner cites no actual examples of terrorists going through the lengthy and invasive asy-
lum application process.  Several of the September 11th bombers were in the United
States on student visas which allow foreign nationals to remain in the United States
for the duration of their course of study. See Six months after Sept. 11, hijackers’ visa
approval letters received, at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/03/12/inv.flight.school.
visas/ (Mar. 13, 2002).  On May 11, 2005 President Bush signed the Real ID Act into
law which will make it more difficult for asylum seekers to win their cases.  REAL ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
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period for obtaining employment authorization coupled with the
streamlined process through which asylum applicants win recom-
mended approval or are placed in removal proceedings within 60
days of filing their applications.  These reforms alone were suffi-
cient to address fraud within the asylum application system.
In light of the success of these other reforms, there is simply
no justification for the one-year filing deadline.  To protect the
world’s most vulnerable individuals, Congress should remove the
deadline from the INA.  If removal of the deadline is unlikely dur-
ing the current Congress,254 reforms should be made to allow indi-
viduals who have been granted withholding of removal to
normalize their immigration status.  The failure to comply with a
procedural deadline is no justification for holding human lives in a
permanent state of limbo—a state of limbo which is produced by
prohibiting those with withholding status from ever traveling
outside the United States or petitioning for relatives to join them
here.  These prohibitions leave those granted withholding unable
to ever fully become a part of American society.
Even in the absence of amendments to the INA, CIS could
take steps to reduce the harshness of the one-year filing require-
ment by relaxing the exceptions to the deadline.  Although the
regulations and the Asylum Officers Training Manual have signaled a
liberalization of the exceptions to the deadline since the IIRIRA
was enacted, in reality the granting of exceptions seems to have
decreased over time, not increased.255  Asylum officers are often
unwilling to give serious consideration to one-year exceptions, opt-
ing instead to refer cases filed outside the deadline to the immigra-
tion court.256
254 Unfortunately, in the current Congress, not only is this possibility unlikely, there
have actually been recent bills proposed which would require asylum seekers to file
their applications within 30 days of arrival in the United States.
255 See supra Part III.B.  Recent figures show that asylum grant rates for the month
of November 2004 were 17% in the New York asylum office, and 16% in the New
Jersey office.  In 2003, the grant rates were 20-25% in New York and 22% in New
Jersey with a national average of 32%.  AILA EOIR/District Counsel/Asylum Commit-
tee in conjunction with the New York Immigration Coalition, New Jersey-New York Asy-
lum Liaison Meeting, Dec. 13, 2004, (on file with Immigration Equality), available at
http://aila.org/infonet/fileViewer.aspx?docID=17152. (Available to AILA members
only).
256 The Author’s experience and the anecdotal accounts of other attorneys indicate
that in the New York and New Jersey Asylum Offices, more often than not, asylum
officers refer applications that have been filed beyond the one-year filing deadline to
immigration court.  Such referrals are based solely on the one-year issue without ana-
lyzing the merits of the case.  In the Author’s experience, the only exceptions which
are routinely recognized by asylum officers are where the applicant maintained valid
non-immigrant status, and where the application was timely filed but returned to the
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In theory, an asylum applicant is entitled to multiple levels of
review to ensure a fair adjudication of her application.  First, her
case is heard by a specially trained asylum officer in a non-adver-
sarial interview.  If unsuccessful, the applicant’s claim goes before
an impartial immigration judge in an adversarial setting.  If the ap-
plicant again loses and is ordered removed, she can appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and, if she again loses, her case can
be heard by a federal court of appeals.
However, the recent changes to immigration law essentially
limit an asylum seeker who misses the one-year filing deadline to
only one opportunity to have her case reviewed.  Increasingly, asy-
lum officers refer late applications to immigration courts with no
meaningful analysis of the one-year exception.  The applicant’s fate
will then hinge almost entirely on the outcome of the hearing
before the immigration judge.  With so little binding precedent in
the area of asylum law and virtually no precedent on one-year is-
sues, results in asylum cases vary wildly from one adjudicator to
another.257  Because federal courts have been almost completely
stripped of jurisdiction to hear one year issues, if an immigration
judge finds that the applicant has failed to meet the one-year dead-
line, the applicant’s only chance for review is before the BIA.258
With a majority of BIA decisions now made by a single Board mem-
ber, and with a majority of these decisions being affirmances with-
out opinion,259 an unsuccessful applicant is unlikely to receive
applicant by the Service Center for a technical deficiency, such as not filling in a box
on the application.
257 One commentator cites a documentary likening the asylum application process
to playing “asylum officer roulette,” stating, “[n]ot only does today’s refugee have to
prove particularized persecution that is consistent with U.S. political objectives, she
must also pray that a sympathetic asylum officer hears and believes her story.”  Bauer,
supra note 140, at 1094.  A report commissioned by the San Jose Mercury News pub-
lished on October 17, 2000 compiled statistics of asylum grant rates for individual
immigration judges in the period between 1995-1999.  The study revealed that eight
judges granted over 50% of the asylum applications they heard whereas 42 judges
granted fewer than 5% of the asylum applications which came before them.
Asylumlaw.org, Legal Tools: Judges, available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/legal_tools/
index.cfm?fuseaction=showJudges&countryID=194 (last visited Jan. 2, 2005) (availa-
ble to asylumlaw.org registered users only) (on file with Immigration Equality).
258 The REAL ID Act has restored federal review of issues of law in removal pro-
ceedings to the Courts of Appeal.  It is too early to tell whether courts will view one
year filing deadline issues as issues of law or fact.
259 According to an article appearing in the L.A. Times in 2003, shortly after Attor-
ney General Ashcroft announced changes in the decision making rules, permitting
single Board members to affirm decisions without opinion, the Board began doing so.
In February 2002, only 9% of the BIA’s decisions were by a single member.  By March
2002, the number had climbed to 38% and by August it had risen to over 50%.  At the
same time that the cases reviewed by a single Board member increased, the denial
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meaningful review at this level.  For issues as significant as those
raised in asylum cases, this situation is simply unacceptable.
Given the limited opportunity for review at higher levels, it is
essential that asylum officers fully evaluate each applicant’s claims
for exceptions to the one-year deadline.  The obstacles which asy-
lum seekers face in meeting the one-year deadline are enor-
mous.260  Officers and judges should apply the regulations liberally,
and understand the hurdles which must be overcome to file an
asylum application.  As an adjudicator hears a particular claim, she
should take into account the particular difficulties which the claim-
ant may have experienced based on the merits of his claim.  As
discussed above, LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers are often
unaware of the possibility of seeking asylum based on their mem-
bership in a particular social group.  If an applicant can give de-
tailed testimony about when he became aware of the possibility of
seeking asylum and can convince an asylum officer or judge of the
delayed awareness, he should be granted an exception to the one-
year deadline.  Even if an adjudicator is unwilling to expand the
exceptions to include lack of awareness, she should take into ac-
count the unique difficulties which LGBT and HIV-positive asylum
seekers face in meeting the deadline, including coming out, fear of
discussing their sexuality with government officials, and dealing
with the effects of serious illness.  For asylum to continue to offer
hope and the prospect of a life free of fear and persecution, the
United States must take steps to open the doors to those legiti-
mately fleeing persecution, not shut them through the formulaic
application of an unjustified filing deadline.
rate rose as well, with an 86% denial rate by October 2002, compared to a 59% denial
rate in October 2001.  Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportations
Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03/
speedierrate.pdf.  In one case in which the applicant’s federal appeal was denied, the
First Circuit found that the Board member who had reviewed the case, had decided
fifty appeals on the day that he decided the appellant’s case, translating into a rate of
one case reviewed every ten minutes.  Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir.
2003).
260 See supra Part IV.A.
